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TOXIC TOYS AND DANGEROUS DRYWALL: HOLDING
FOREIGN MANUFACTURERS LIABLE FOR DEFECTIVE
PRODUCTS—THE FUND CONCEPT
INTRODUCTION
The mid-decade building boom coupled with post-Hurricane Katrina
reconstruction led to a nationwide drywall shortage in the United States in
2005 and 2006, forcing builders to turn to imports.1 Prior to 2005, drywall
imports from China were negligible; however, since 2006, the United States
has imported more than 550 million pounds of drywall from China because it
is “abundant and cheap.”2 This Chinese-made drywall has proven to be
defective, and, as a result, thousands of U.S. citizens have sustained economic
damage to their homes and incurred health problems.3 The drywall emits
hydrogen sulfide gas, which produces a rotten-egg odor, corrodes metal, and
destroys electronic equipment.4 In addition, American consumers have
reported various physical ailments, such as breathing difficulties, persistent
coughs, bloody noses, recurrent headaches, and asthma attacks.5
Chinese drywall presents one of the largest and most complex defective
product conundrums the U.S. government has ever encountered.6 Thus far, the
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (“CPSC”), the government agency
responsible for protecting the public from injury or death from consumer

1 Jason Hanna, Chinese-Made Drywall Ruining Homes, Owners Say, CNN (Mar. 18, 2009),
http://articles.cnn.com/2009-03-18/us/chinese.drywall_1_chinese-made-drywall-homeowners-appliances.
According to the Consumer Product Safety Commission, shipping records show the United States has
imported 6.5 million sheets of Chinese-made drywall since December 2005. Aaron Kessler & Joaquin Sapien,
SPECIAL REPORT: Federal Failure on Chinese Drywall, HERALD-TRIB. (Dec. 14, 2010, 6:45 PM), http://
www.heraldtribune.com/article/20101214/ARTICLE/101219891.
2 Brian Skoloff, Cheap Chinese Drywall Causing Another Round of Nightmares, WASH. POST (Oct. 17,
2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/16/AR2009101600082.html; accord
Tim Padgett, Is Drywall the Next Chinese Import Scandal?, TIME (Mar. 23, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/
nation/article/0,8599,1887059,00.html.
3 Skoloff, supra note 2.
4 Andrew Martin, Drywall Flaws: Owners Gain Limited Relief, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2010), http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/09/18/business/18drywall.html.
5 Drywall Information Center, U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, http://www.cpsc.gov/info/
drywall/where.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
6 Kessler & Sapien, supra note 1. The cost of repairing an average-size house (replacing all the drywall,
the wiring, and the air-conditioning system) is about $100,000. Id.
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products, has received more than 3,805 complaints about the drywall and
believes thousands of others have failed to report the problem.7 Approximately
5,600 homeowners have filed suits, but because the current legal system makes
it virtually impossible for U.S. plaintiffs to sue Chinese manufacturers, legal
redress is limited or nonexistent for the majority of these consumers.8 Three
primary procedural hurdles—personal jurisdiction, service of process, and
enforcement of the judgment—prevent suits against Chinese manufacturers.9
While injured consumers may bring suit in the United States against importers,
distributors, and sellers of the defective drywall,10 many of these potential
defendants are out of business, bankrupt, or possess insufficient assets to
satisfy a judgment. As a result, many consumers are left with no one to sue and
thus no compensation for the harm they incurred.
Chinese manufacturers have successfully argued that U.S. courts do not
have jurisdiction over them.11 Virginia Senator Mark Warner, whose office is
helping Virginia drywall victims negotiate with their home mortgage lenders,
remarked, “[Foreign manufacturers] can avoid liability and there’s almost
nothing we can do about it right now.”12 Injured consumers are left to seek
legal recourse in the United States or go uncompensated. As a result, many
homeowners affected by faulty Chinese drywall are facing foreclosure and
bankruptcy.13 Pamela Gilbert, a former executive director of the CPSC during
the Clinton Administration, noted, “Our current consumer protection laws
don’t adequately address product liability in a globalized economy . . . . And
these problems are only going to get worse in the future.”14 The U.S. Supreme
Court has also recognized the shortcomings and difficulties present in this area
of the law, and in late 2010 the Court granted certiorari in two cases, J.

7 Drywall Information Center, supra note 5; Martin, supra note 4. “A database compiled by the HeraldTribune and ProPublica shows that at least 6,944 homeowners are seeking help for problems created by
contaminated drywall.” Kessler & Sapien, supra note 1.
8 Martin, supra note 4. One company, Knauf Plasterboard Tianjin, a Chinese–German joint venture, has
begun settlement negotiations with homeowners. Id.
9 Leveling the Playing Field and Protecting Americans: Holding Foreign Manufacturers Accountable:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the S. Judiciary Comm., 111th Cong. 4
(2009) (statement of Louise Ellen Teitz, Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law)
[hereinafter Hearing—Leveling the Playing Field].
10 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (1998).
11 Martin, supra note 4.
12 Kessler & Sapien, supra note 1.
13 Monsurat Adebanjo, Gov’t Failing To Deal with Bad Drywall, CBS NEWS (Dec. 15, 2010, 3:06 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-31727_162-20025776-10391695.html.
14 Kessler & Sapien, supra note 1.
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McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro15 and Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown,16 concerning jurisdiction in U.S. courts over foreign
manufacturers in the context of a globalized society.17
The two cases, J. McIntyre and Goodyear, deal with the stream of
commerce theory of personal jurisdiction as it pertains to specific and general
jurisdiction, respectively.18 On January 11, 2011, the Court heard oral
argument in both cases.19 The Court revisited the requirements under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for state courts to assert personal
jurisdiction over foreign defendants.20 On the last day of its 2010–2011 term,
the Court issued opinions in the two cases. In J. McIntyre, the Court addressed
whether the state of New Jersey could exercise jurisdiction over a foreign
(English) manufacturer when the plaintiff was injured by the defendant’s
product in New Jersey.21 The Court issued a fractured 4-2-3 decision, holding
that the manufacturer was not subject to personal jurisdiction in the state of
New Jersey because it had not engaged in conduct purposefully directed at
New Jersey.22 In Goodyear, the Court addressed whether foreign subsidiaries
of a U.S. parent corporation are amenable to suit in state court based on claims
that are unrelated to any activity of the subsidiaries in the forum state.23 The
Court reached a unanimous decision, reversing the North Carolina Court of
Appeals’ ruling that the foreign Goodyear subsidiaries were subject to North
Carolina’s general jurisdiction because some of the defendant’s tires had
reached the state through the stream of commerce.24 The unanimous ruling in
15

J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
17 Peter Trooboff, The Global Reach of U.S. Personal Jurisdiction, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 13, 2010, available
at
http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/39e9f9b2-f78f-4328-af70-e7786215eba4/Presentation/Publication
Attachment/eb4ee708-e070-4ac3-b867-eb28d5b0ccdb/The%20Global%20Reach%20of%20U.S.%20Personal
%20Jurisdiction.pdf.
18 Mark R. Vespole, Stream of Commerce in the 21st Century: McIntyre and Goodyear: Potential
Ramifications of U.S. Supreme Court Decision on NJ and NC Long Arm Jurisdiction Statutes,
LEXISNEXISCOMMUNITIES LITIG. RESOURCE COMMUNITY (Dec. 13, 2010, 3:50 PM), https://www.lexisnexis.
com/COMMUNITY/LITIGATIONRESOURCECENTER/blogs/litigationcommentary/archive/2010/12/17/pot
ential-ramifications-of-supreme-court-decision-on-n-j-n-c-long-arm-jurisdiction-statutes.aspx.
19 Allison Torres Burtka, Supreme Court Takes On States’ Jurisdiction over Foreign Manufacturers, AM.
ASS’N FOR JUST. (Jan. 20, 2011), http://www.justice.org/cps/rde/xchg/justice/hs.xsl/14246.htm.
20 Id.
21 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2785 (2011).
22 Id. at 2791.
23 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2850 (2011).
24 Id. at 2851. The Court reiterated the standard for general jurisdiction, noting that “a court may assert
general jurisdiction over foreign corporations . . . when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and
systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.” Id.
16
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Goodyear made it clear that introducing goods into the stream of commerce in
a state was an insufficient basis for a court to exercise general jurisdiction over
foreign subsidiaries when the accident occurred elsewhere.25 However, the
divided ruling in J. McIntyre failed to announce a standard for determining
when foreign firms are subject to specific jurisdiction in U.S. court, thereby
virtually ensuring that the justices will consider the issue again.26 Although the
Court’s holdings addressed key jurisdictional questions, neither case addressed
enforcing U.S. judgments against foreign manufacturers. Absent a mechanism
for enforcement, U.S. consumers will likely be unable to collect on judgments.
Attempt at revision in this area of the law has not been limited to the
judiciary. The Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act of 2010
(“2010 Act”) was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives in February
2010, aiming to combat the lack of jurisdiction over foreign manufacturers.27
The 2010 Act died in committee, and was reintroduced in December 2011 as
the Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act of 2011 (“2011 Act”).28
As the 2011 Act is in the early stages of the legislative process at the time of
this writing,29 this Comment considers the language and implications of both
bills, as well as the legislative and public responses to the 2010 bill. The 2010
and 2011 Acts, both initiated by Ohio Democrat Betty Sutton in response to
the toxic Chinese-made drywall debacle, would require foreign manufacture to
appoint a registered agent in the United States to accept service of process on
behalf of the manufacturer.30 By accepting service of process, the manufacturer
would thereby consent to personal jurisdiction in the state in which the
appointed agent is located.31 The bills propose a solution to jurisdictional and

25 Kimberly Atkins, Court Creates Confusion on Foreign Product Liability Suits, LEGALNEWS.COM (July
21, 2011), http://www.legalnews.com/detroit/1016629.
26 Id.
27 Kessler & Sapien, supra note 1; Bill Summary & Status 111th Congress (2009–2010) H.R.4678, LIBR.
CONGRESS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR04678:|/home/LegislativeData.php?n=BSS;c=
111 (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
28 H.R. 4678 (111th): Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act of 2010, GOVTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr4678 (last visited Mar. 20, 2012) [hereinafter H.R. 4678:
Govtrack]; Bill Summary & Status 112th Congress (2011–2012) H.R. 3646, LIBR. OF CONGRESS,
http://http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?d112:1:./temp/~bdZY4R::|/home/LegislativeData.php?n=BSS;
c=112 (last visited Mar. 20, 2012).
29 H.R. 3646: Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act of 2011, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.
govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr3646 (last visited Mar. 23, 2012).
30 Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act of 2011, H.R. 3646, 112th Cong. (2011); Foreign
Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act of 2010, H.R. 4678, 111th Cong. (2010).
31 H.R. 3646 § 3(c)(1); H.R. 4678 § 3(c)(1).
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service of process issues, but, like the Supreme Court cases, fail to address
enforcement of U.S. court judgments overseas.
Presently, U.S. consumers who have been injured by a Chinese-made
product and are unable to bring suit against a responsible party in the United
States will not be compensated for their injury. In this regard, the U.S. legal
system has failed to provide adequate protection for U.S. consumers.32
Additionally, the U.S. government currently lacks any obligation to reimburse
consumers for the harm they have incurred.33 This Comment proposes creation
of a fund for injured consumers, thereby alleviating the undue burden on these
individuals. Chinese manufacturers responsible for producing defective
products that have injured U.S. consumers would be required to contribute to
the fund before continuing to export their products to the United States. The
fund would be distributed solely to compensate injured consumers.
This Comment argues that current U.S. law fails to provide an adequate
mechanism to ensure U.S. consumers are economically compensated for
injuries sustained by Chinese-made products. Part I explores the history of the
United States–China trade relationship and highlights China’s position as the
world’s leading exporter. It delves into the multitude of reasons Chinese
products are poorly made and examines why, despite quality problems, the
United States continues to import from China. Part II outlines the procedural
hurdles in place for suing a Chinese manufacturer and examines why U.S. law
has failed to hold manufacturers liable for their faulty products. Part III
advocates for the creation of a fund that would serve dual purposes: deterring
Chinese manufacturers from releasing defective products in the United States
and compensating victims.
I. BACKGROUND
Trade relations between the United States and China commenced in the
early days of U.S. independence, and, since the turn of the twenty-first century,
China has blossomed into the United States’ primary trade partner and has

32

This failure provides a multi-billion dollar windfall for the Chinese because manufacturers avoid
accident costs in the pricing of their manufactured goods. Manufacturers can evade U.S. lawsuits; therefore,
they forego both the cost of prevention and the cost of liability associated with faulty products. See Elizabeth
Ann Hunt, Comment, Made in China: Who Bears the Loss and Why?, 27 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 915, 918–19
(2009).
33 Kessler & Sapien, supra note 1.
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earned the title “manufacturer to the world.”34 Although the United States
benefits economically from cheap products manufactured in China, some of
these products pose a risk of shoddy manufacturing and have led to injuries
and product recalls in the United States.35 A combination of political and
economic factors has led to production of defective Chinese products, and both
the United States and China are to blame.
A. History of United States–China Trade Relations
The United States–China trade relationship, although somewhat marred by
poorly made Chinese goods, is historically and economically significant. The
United States was China’s leading trade partner at the end of World War II;
however, the trade relationship between the two countries dissipated following
the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949.36 In the wake of
President Richard Nixon’s momentous visit to China in 1972, trade between
the two nations was renewed.37 On July 6, 1979, the United States and China
signed the Agreement on Trade Relations, formally establishing diplomatic
ties.38
In 1980, the United States restored China’s Most-Favored Nation status
(now Normal Trade Relations) guaranteeing China the same trading
opportunities accorded to all other favored nations.39 In 2000, the United States
granted China Permanent Normal Trade Relations (“PNTR”).40 Paul Midler, a
consultant and middleman for Chinese factories and U.S. companies, recounts
the PNTR debate in the U.S. Congress:
[T]here was a chance for the United States to hold out for political
and economic reform in China, but the opportunity was lost.
Improved structural conditions made possible then might have more
appropriately set the stage for stability going forward. Instead,
34 China’s Economic Growth: The Next Wave, COMMITTEE FOR ECON. DEV. AUSTL. (Nov. 10, 2010),
http://www.ceda.com.au/research-and-policy/current-topics/ace/2010/11/10/china_parkinson; Jiawen Yang,
Sino–U.S. Trade Relations, GW CENTER FOR STUDY GLOBALIZATION (Jan. 2004), http://globalgrn.files.
wordpress.com/2009/08/sino-us-trade-relations.pdf.
35 Kessler & Sapien, supra note 1.
36 Yang, supra note 34, at 1. By 1951, trade between the United States and China had come to a halt. Id.
37 Id.
38 Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of
China, U.S.-P.R.C., July 7, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4651.
39 China’s Most-Favored Nation status had previously been suspended in 1951. VLADIMIR N. PREGELJ,
CONG. RES. SERV., MOST-FAVORED-NATION STATUS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1 (2001), available
at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl30225.pdf.
40 Yang, supra note 34, at 2.
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American politicians and business leaders rushed headlong into
greater levels of interdependency with China, a nation whose
41
reliability is questionable.

The United States opted to open the door to unrestricted trade with China
before China was sufficiently mature.42 Prior to 2000, the U.S. Congress had to
review and renew China’s Most-Favored Nation status on an annual basis.43
However, once the United States granted PNTR, the status was permanent and
unarguable, and the United States surrendered significant leverage over
China.44 During the PNTR debate, politicians advocating for free trade with
China never suggested that the “American public would be involved in any
sort of trade-off.”45 There was an assumption that China would become easier
to work with as it rose to prosperity; however, the manufacturer–importer
relationship has proven the opposite to be true.46
China became a member of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) in
2001,47 and since that time, trade has consistently grown between the United
States and China.48 In 2001, the United States imported $102.3 billion of
consumer products from China.49 By 2009, that number had risen to $296.4
billion.50 Today, the United States is China’s top export destination,51 meaning
U.S. consumers are at a higher risk of encountering defective Chinese-made
products than other countries.

41

PAUL MIDLER, POORLY MADE IN CHINA: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE TACTICS BEHIND CHINA’S
PRODUCTION GAME 240 (2009).
42 See id. Midler believes that this decision was motivated by U.S. greed—that U.S. politicians were
unable to overcome the lure of cheaply made goods from China. Id.
43 Yang, supra note 34, at 2.
44 Id. Congress no longer conducted an annual review of “China’s activities regarding unfair trade
practices, human rights and national security.” Jim Burns, Congressmen Work on Bill Revoking PNTR for
China, CNSNEWS.COM (July 7, 2008), http://www.cnsnews.com/node/10184. Under the WTO, the United
States retains the right to protect its national security interests, which include the revocation of PNTR if
necessary. Furthermore, Congress can choose to revoke PNTR at any time “if circumstances warrant and
Congress is willing to forego WTO benefits.” Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, White House, Fact
Sheet on Benefits of PNTR for American Workers (May 12, 2000), available at http://archives.
clintonpresidentialcenter.org/?u=051200-fact-sheet-on-benefits-of-pntr-for-american-workers.htm.
45 MIDLER, supra note 41, at 198.
46 Id. at 240.
47 China Officially Joins WTO, CNNWORLD (Nov. 10, 2001), http://articles.cnn.com/2001-1110/world/china.WTO_1_wto-meeting-wto-director-general-mike-moore-world-trade-organization.
48 US—China Trade Statistics and China’s World Trade Statistics, US–CHINA BUS. COUNCIL, http://
www.uschina.org/statistics/tradetable.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2012).
49 Id.
50 Id. tbl.1.
51 Id. tbl.8.
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B. China: Manufacturer to the World
In early 2010, China overtook Germany to become the world’s largest
exporter and now accounts for almost ten percent of total world exports.52 In
the second quarter of 2010, China passed Japan to become the world’s secondlargest economy behind the United States.53 These statistics evidence China’s
rapid economic ascendance54 and solidify its position as a global economic
superpower.55 China’s export industry has been a “powerful engine of growth”
that thrives due to its ability to produce cheap products.56 Alexandra Harney,
an expert on Asian business, argues that no single country has ever “yielded
such visible price declines on such a wide range of goods.”57 For example,
China has been able to short-circuit the traditional timeline of consumer
electronic manufacturing.58 Wilf Corrigan, the chairman and CEO of LSI
Logic, an American company making video players for the Chinese market,
noted that when new technology is released, it traditionally takes two years for
the technology to be sold below its initial price and five to seven years for it to
reach the mass market at a substantially lower price.59 However, China’s low
labor costs, vast consumer population, and competition among manufacturers
have allowed the Chinese to produce sophisticated, low-priced electronics
much faster than what was traditionally possible.60
Harney compares China’s ability to undercut prices to a second industrial
revolution: “Since the start of the new millennium, China has come to
dominate global manufacturing in a way almost inconceivable before its rise.
The prices it offers have been so low . . . they have become known simply as
the China price.”61 U.S. consumers, who have become aware of and
accustomed to “the China price,” demand these lower prices, and American

52 Press Release, World Trade Org., Trade To Expand by 9.5% in 2010 After a Dismal 2009, WTO
Reports (Mar. 26, 2010), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres10_e/pr598_e.htm.
53 David Barboza, China Overtakes Japan To Become No. 2 Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2010, at B1.
54 In 2005, China’s gross domestic product was approximately half of Japan’s. Id.
55 Id.; India’s Surprising Economic Miracle, ECONOMIST, Oct. 2nd–8th 2010, at 11 (stating that China’s
rapid, sustained growth has lifted hundreds of millions of Chinese out of poverty).
56 ALEXANDRA HARNEY, THE CHINA PRICE 8 (2008); see also Stoking Protectionism, ECONOMIST (Aug.
16, 2007), http://www.economist.com/node/9657177.
57 HARNEY, supra note 56, at 3.
58 Ted C. Fishman, The Chinese Century, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2004, § 6 (Magazine), at 31.
59 Id.
60 Id. Even when new features are added, prices continue to drop. Id.
61 HARNEY, supra note 56, at 2.
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businesses are under pressure to match “the China price” to retain their
customers and remain competitive.62
“The China price” is possible partially because China possesses the world’s
largest manufacturing workforce.63 China has a manufacturing workforce of
104 million; this is roughly twice the combined workforces of the United
States, Canada, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom.64
While China does not possess the cheapest workforce in the world, it has
become the world’s workshop because its workers are reliable, capable, and
disciplined.65 Chinese workers are motivated by the nation’s twin virtues of
patriotism and hard work.66 Sometimes this means working twelve- to
eighteen-hour days, seven days a week, in unsafe labor conditions.67 Mao
Zedong, who believed China’s wealth lay in its abundant population, is
credited with mobilizing Chinese labor as an alternative to machinery.68
Today, the use of highly skilled workers who cost only a few hundred dollars a
month (as opposed to multi-million dollar machines) allows a company such as
Wanfeng Automotive, located outside Shanghai, to sell its handmade luxury
version of the American Jeep for merely $8,000 to $10,000.69 China has been
able to successfully alter the competitive landscape of the global marketplace
by employing people in place of machines.70
In addition to the abundance and relatively low cost of labor, startup costs
for U.S. companies in China are minimal.71 Chinese manufacturers offer U.S.
companies enticing incentives to initiate a business relationship.72 Competition
among Chinese factories is fierce, and manufacturers “ben[d] over backwards”
to attract foreign clients and “to make it seem as though doing business with

62 Fishman, supra note 58, at 46; India’s Surprising Economic Miracle, supra note 55 (“[I]f your supply
chain for manufactured goods does not pass through China your shareholders will demand to know why.”).
63 HARNEY, supra note 56, at 8.
64 Id.
65 Fishman, supra note 58, at 28.
66 Id. Undisciplined or undermotivated workers are easily replaced with other poor, unemployed Chinese
workers anxious for work. Id.
67 See, e.g., HARNEY, supra note 56, at 108 (describing the working conditions of an undocumented
migrant working in a plastic bag factory in China). Factory wages along China’s east coast can be $120 to
$160 a month, and half of that in inland China. Fishman, supra note 58, at 28.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 See MIDLER, supra note 41, at 20–21.
72 Id.
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them [is] a breeze.”73 Chinese manufacturers can take a company’s product
sample and move it into production quickly and for a competitive price.74 Ten
years ago, Wanfeng Automotive was “hammering out motorcycle wheels by
hand in a Chinese garage”; only a few years later it was the top seller of
aluminum alloy motorcycle wheels in China, and later in Asia.75 One of the
key factors driving Chinese competitiveness is the ability of Chinese workers
to adapt to the production of new products.
A more troubling reason that “the China price” is possible stems from
demands from U.S. consumers and companies for cheap goods coupled with
China’s willingness to cut costs and skip safety measures.76 U.S. suppliers
experience pressure from their customers to relocate production to China or to
use Chinese subcontractors in their production lines.77 Companies like
Walmart, which insists on “Every Day Low Prices,”78 epitomize U.S.
consumers’ appetite for cheap products. American consumers “once preferred
to see the MADE IN USA tag, but there [was] another shift in the marketplace.
Somewhere along the line, made in China began to sound like a bargain.”79
Economists estimate that cheap products from China save the average
American household $500 a year.80 This statistic, however, fails to take into
account certain unquantifiable risk factors, primarily that the products may be
defective or dangerous.81 One commenter has argued, “United States
consumers cannot reasonably be expected to consider the costs of melamine
and lead paint, or a skipped safety measure, if they are completely unaware and
unadvised.”82 Midler poses the question: “How much [is] it worth to know that
the products you purchased were lead- or melamine free?”83 Quality control
issues that accompany Chinese-made products are passed along to U.S.
consumers, along with the cheap prices.

73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83

Id. at 20.
Id. at 20–21.
Fishman, supra note 58, at 28.
HARNEY, supra note 56, at 35; MIDLER, supra note 41, at 166.
Fishman, supra note 58, at 46.
About Us, WALMART CORP., http://walmartstores.com/AboutUs/7606.aspx (last visited Mar. 4, 2012).
MIDLER, supra note 41, at 172.
Fishman, supra note 58.
MIDLER, supra note 41, at 197.
Hunt, supra note 32, at 918. Melamine is an industrial chemical. Id. at 916 n.10.
MIDLER, supra note 41, at 197.
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Finally, China’s low prices are possible partly because they fail to reflect
the potential accident costs posed by their goods.84 Judge Richard Posner’s
accident reduction theory suggests actors will forego preventative measures
when the cost of accidents, and therefore the cost of liability, is less than the
cost of prevention.85 Chinese manufacturers can evade economic and legal
liability; therefore, they have no financial incentive to install preventative
measures. As a result, the price of their goods fails to account for products
liability risks.86 By evading liability, Chinese manufacturers have created a
quality problem and asked U.S. importers, distributors, and retailers to assume
all the associated legal and economic risks.87
C. Why Chinese Products Are Poorly Made
“The China price” is economically alluring, but the lack of legal liability
dissuades Chinese manufacturers from focusing on safety, resulting in poorly
made products. The United States and China share the blame for the creation
of a cost-cutting culture that has led to the production of defective products
manufactured in China. While China is responsible for actually producing the
goods, the United States is guilty of continually demanding and consuming
such substandard products. There are three primary reasons poorly made
Chinese products are abundant. First, Chinese governmental oversight is
deficient. The Chinese government has failed to provide a workable structure
to implement product safety laws, and its response to product safety incidents
is dismal.88 Second, Chinese manufacturers embrace unsafe cost-cutting
measures to increase their profit margins.89 Finally, Chinese manufacturers are
firmly entrenched in global supply chains; China has emerged as the world’s
leading supplier for many consumer goods, and its prices are unmatched.90

84

Hunt, supra note 32, at 918–19.
Richard Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33 (1972).
86 Hunt, supra note 32, at 918–19.
87 China’s Toxic Toymaker, ECONOMIST, Aug. 18th–24th 2007, at 58 (“No doubt many importers will
examine their supply chains more carefully, if only for fear that they will be sued by customers who have
bought poisonous furniture or explosive mobile telephones, and shunned by others who hear about such
fiascos.”).
88 HARNEY, supra note 56, at 256–57; The Poison Spreads, ECONOMIST, Sept. 27th–Oct. 3rd 2008, at 77–
78.
89 Shoddy Work: Why So Many Chinese Products Are Born To Be Bad, ECONOMIST, May 16th–22nd
2009, at 89 [hereinafter Shoddy Work].
90 Stoking Protectionism, supra note 56.
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1. Deficient Chinese Governmental Oversight
The rapid economic and social development in China has “outpaced the
development of government institutions.”91 As a result, the Chinese
government has failed to provide a workable framework to implement product
safety. Adding to the problem, enforcement of the law in China is riddled with
corruption.92 Although the Chinese government drafts policy, it has
traditionally delegated enforcement to local governments.93 The local officials
parse the government’s policies and decide which policies to enforce and the
appropriate degree of enforcement.94 This form of governance results in patchy
implementation of rules and regulations regarding product quality.95 In the
1980s and 1990s, the planned economy in China failed to create a sufficient
number of jobs, and the Communist Party turned to private industry to employ
the remaining workers.96 Those who provided the necessary jobs earned
political clout with government officials, and these unhealthy links between
government and business persist today.97 Consequently, manufacturers with
close relationships to the Communist Party, especially those who are able to
attract foreign investors, often enjoy a free pass when it comes to enforcement
of safety regulations.98
Chinese government officials are notorious for accepting bribes from
manufacturers to approve their products without undergoing the legally
mandated testing processes.99 In 2007, China executed Zheng Xiaoyu, the
former head of China’s State Food and Drug Administration, for taking bribes
and approving fake medicines.100 Following the Xiaoyu scandal, the General
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine, a Chinese
government agency, surveyed a range of Chinese food and consumer products
and found that almost one-fifth were substandard.101 Lax standards and
inconsistent enforcement in China allow defective products to leave the
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HARNEY, supra note 56, at 256.
See Stoking Protectionism, supra note 56.
93 HARNEY, supra note 56, at 257.
94 Id.
95 Stoking Protectionism, supra note 56.
96 MIDLER, supra note 41, at 234.
97 Id.; Stoking Protectionism, supra note 56.
98 MIDLER, supra note 41, at 234–35; The Poison Spreads, supra note 88.
99 China Food Safety Head Executed, BBC (July 10, 2007, 11:36 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
6286698.stm.
100 Stoking Protectionism, supra note 56.
101 Id.
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country, bound for the U.S. market. Not only do Chinese government officials
fail to appropriately monitor production, but they also fail to protect consumers
when dangerous products are released into the market.
China is infamous for denying allegations of product inferiority. In 2007,
U.S. toy company Mattel, the world’s largest toymaker, recalled millions of
Chinese-made toys due to lead paint and dangerous magnets.102 As the Mattel
recalls unfolded, China issued a series of denials and claimed the “productsafety issue ha[d] been whipped out of proportion by the foreign media.”103
Similarly, pets in the United States started dying in 2007 because of Chinesemade pet food contaminated by melamine, an industrial chemical that is
harmful if swallowed.104 In response, Chinese officials issued emphatic denials
claiming, “[t]he poisoning of American pets has nothing to do with China.”105
In September 2008, six children died and more than 300,000 became ill in
China due to tainted milk powder.106 Evidence reveals that the Chinese
government began filtering out information on the internet about tainted milk
in December 2007 in an effort to protect China’s reputation during the year
preceding the Beijing Olympics.107 Toward the end of September 2008, as the
problem grew to massive proportions, the Chinese government’s response
changed “seemingly overnight, from suppression to intervention.”108 Although
the Chinese government had an opportunity to suppress the milk powder
scandal in 2007 by issuing an early warning, it chose to hide the problem until
it became a national crisis.

102 Jyoti Thottam, Why Mattel Apologized to China, TIME (Sept. 21, 2007), http://www.time.com/time/
business/article/0,8599,1664428,00.html. Chinese-made toys were manufactured with strong magnets, which if
swallowed in multiples could rip through a young child’s intestines. Id. In August 2007, Zhang Shuong, who
owned a factory that made Mattel toys, hanged himself following Mattel’s massive recalls in the summer of
2007. China’s Toxic Toymaker, supra note 87.
103 Stoking Protectionism, supra note 56.
104 Kate Pickert, Brief History of Melamine, TIME (Sept. 17, 2008), http://www.time.com/time/health/
article/0,8599,1841757,00.html.
105 See China’s Food Safety: A New Plan To Improve Standards of Food and Drugs, ECONOMIST (June
12, 2007), http://www.economist.com/node/9325404. After denying responsibility for the contaminated pet
food, the Chinese mounted a “counter-attack noting that food contamination occurred both within the US and
with US exports to China.” Id. Later, Chinese officials released a five-year food-and-drug safety plan, which
called for increased inspections of food exports and a more sophisticated procedure for recalling faulty
products. Id.
106 China Executed Two over Tainted Milk Powder Scandal, BBC (Nov. 24, 2009, 12:03 AM), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8375638.stm.
107 The Poison Spreads, supra note 88.
108 Id.
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China’s initial reaction of denying responsibility for product safety issues
gives way to draconian punishment when the problems become undeniable.109
As previously discussed, China executed Zheng Xiaoyu, former head of the
State Food and Drug Administration, for accepting bribes and approving
substandard products.110 China’s reaction to the tainted milk powder scandal
was similarly severe. The government executed two people and sentenced
nineteen others to prison terms.111 The Chinese government could alleviate
harm to consumers at home and abroad by simply identifying, acknowledging,
and alerting consumers to the potentially hazardous goods produced by
Chinese manufacturers. However, instead of issuing early warnings, the
government historically denies responsibility until numerous consumers have
sustained significant injuries.
2. Product Degradation: Quality Fade, Subcontracting, and Third-Party
Auditing
The Chinese government fails to provide top-down leadership and
enforcement relating to product safety, but Chinese manufacturers are equally
responsible for the production of substandard products. “Quality fade,” or
“incremental degradation of a product over time,” is to blame for many poorly
made Chinese products.112 Chinese manufacturers lure U.S. importers into
relationships, offering speed of production, the convenience of manufacturing
in a single location, and low prices.113 Midler describes the process thus:
“Typically, the importer negotiates pricing in advance of any order; then
throughout the production process the [manufacturer] looks for savings at
every step.”114 Initially, the manufacturer will generate a product that matches
the importer’s specifications.115 After initial shipments, the manufacturer will
resort to cost-cutting techniques, some of which are unsavory and dangerous:
“Packaging is cheapened, chemical formulations altered, sanitary standards
curtailed, and on and on, in a series of continual product debasements.”116
Chinese manufacturers thereby transform “profitless contracts into lucrative
relationships” by devaluing the manufacturing process and passing off the
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116

Id.
See supra text accompanying note 100.
China Executed Two over Tainted Milk Powder Scandal, supra note 106.
MIDLER, supra note 41, at 96.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 83.
Shoddy Work, supra note 89.
Id.
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increased product risk to the importer, and eventually to the consumer who
discovers the product’s flaws.117
Subcontracting, which can cut costs and accelerate production, is a
common practice in China.118 One auditor of Chinese factories estimates that
ninety-nine percent of factories in China have a “shadow” factory, an off-site
manufacturing building that helps to meet the customer’s demands.119 U.S.
customers, who typically demand to work directly with the factory owners,
often have no knowledge of these “shadow” factories, which add an additional
level to an already complicated supply chain and make products particularly
difficult to trace.120 As a result, the source of a dangerous product often cannot
be identified.121 Midler notes, “You can’t control for quality that you can’t
see. . . . Anything you are trying to monitor, you can’t monitor if the product is
being made somewhere else.”122 When U.S. companies take production to
China, they surrender the ability to oversee each step of the manufacturing
process, and monitoring subcontracting from abroad is extremely difficult.
Even reputable companies that carefully monitor their supply chains and
emphasize product quality, like Mattel, can still fall victim to the dangers of
subcontracting.123 Mattel CEO Bob Eckert blamed the 2007 lead paint toy
recall on a subcontractor who used paint from a non-authorized third-party
supplier, in violation of Mattel’s policies.124 Unless U.S. companies can
successfully monitor their suppliers’ subcontractors, there is no guarantee of
where, how, or to what standards the products are made.125
The United States, aware of “quality fade” and subcontracting, has
implemented third-party auditing in an attempt to combat substandard
production in China.126 In theory, auditing is a logical way to monitor Chinese
manufacturers. In practice, however, audits fail to provide the necessary
oversight.127 The moment U.S. importers suspect a Chinese manufacturer is
117

Id.
HARNEY, supra note 56, at 46.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 47 (quoting Paul Midler) (internal quotation marks omitted).
122 Id.
123 Stoking Protectionism, supra note 56; China’s Toxic Toymaker, supra note 87.
124 Thottam, supra note 102. One of Mattel’s contract manufacturers allegedly engaged the subcontractor.
Stoking Protectionism, supra note 56.
125 HARNEY, supra note 56, at 47.
126 See Dexter Roberts & Pete Engardio, Secrets, Lies, and Sweatshops, BUSINESSWEEK, Nov. 27, 2006,
at 50.
127 Id.
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cutting corners, the importers typically implement an audit.128 Unfortunately,
these inspections are often “more form than function.”129 Corruption within the
auditing industry is widespread and bribes make a mockery of the process.130
Many auditors in China have no qualifications and factory managers routinely
offer auditors money under the table so the auditor will give the factory a
positive review.131 U.S. companies are not merely innocent players
unknowingly subjected to China’s faulty auditing practices. Some U.S.
companies who hire auditors tell the inspectors candidly that the inspection is
simply a gesture.132 U.S. companies want to appear as though they take product
control seriously, yet do not want the inspectors to audit too strictly or report
too many problems.133 If problems can go undetected by consumers,
companies prefer not to know about substandard products.134 U.S. companies
buy from China in order to save money and satiate demand for cheaper
products.135 This constant pressure to produce cheap goods incentivizes
Chinese manufacturers to break the law to comply with demand. As a result,
U.S. companies are caught between the desire to evade costly and disruptive
hitches in their manufacturing processes and the fear of being responsible for
producing a dangerous product.136
3. China’s Economic Edge and Resulting Quality Control Issues
Chinese manufacturers get away with “quality fade”137 and questionable
subcontracting practices because they occupy a key place in Western supply
chains and have positioned themselves as the leading suppliers for many
goods.138 Even when U.S. companies are unhappy about the product quality
from China, alternative manufacturing sources are limited and China’s low
prices are unmatched.139 The economic benefits of manufacturing in China are

128

Shoddy Work, supra note 89.
Id.
130 HARNEY, supra note 56, at 210–11.
131 Id. at 209–211.
132 Id. at 227.
133 Id.
134 Shoddy Work, supra note 89.
135 HARNEY, supra note 56, at 227.
136 Shoddy Work, supra note 89.
137 Id.
138 Stoking Protectionism, supra note 56. Seventy to eighty percent of the toys sold in the United States
are made in China. Eric S. Lipton & David Barboza, As More Toys Are Recalled, Trail Ends in China, N.Y.
TIMES (June 19, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/19/business/worldbusiness/19toys.html.
139 Stoking Protectionism, supra note 56.
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so significant that importers are forced to deal with potential product quality
drawbacks.140 Although Mattel recalled millions of Chinese-made toys in
2007, incurring economic and reputational damage, the company continues to
outsource its manufacturing to China.141 Jyoti Thottam notes, “Mattel needs
China just as much as China needs Mattel, and it cannot afford to jeopardize its
relationship with the country that produces 65% of its toys.”142 While U.S.
companies may become more selective about which manufacturers they choose
to work with, it is “unlikely there [will] be a large shift out of Chinese
products.”143 China has firmly entrenched itself in U.S. manufacturing supply
chains and the mutual economic benefits indicate that the United States will
remain China’s primary export market as China further expands its
manufacturing prowess.
China is still developing as a country and is arguably going through the
same quality cycle that Japan endured in its post-World War II development
and that the United States encountered during the nineteenth-century
manufacturing boom.144 Economists acknowledge that every developing
economy undergoes quality issues and substandard products.145 China is
maturing in front of the entire developed world and is subjected to more
scrutiny than either Japan or the United States suffered.146 However, China’s
quality control issues differ from those of Japan and the United States due to
the type and the extent of quality manipulation involved.147 China is not simply
working out the kinks in its manufacturing process or merely cutting corners;
Chinese manufacturers are intentionally manipulating the quality of the
product to bypass third-party quality assurance tests and “slip one past the
inspectors.”148 Chinese manufacturers are not only shortcutting the production
process in an attempt to save money, but are also deliberately substituting
inferior products in such a way that their clients cannot detect the change.149
Although experts on Chinese production predicted relationships with Chinese
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manufacturers would mature over time, factory owners have continued to
deceive U.S. customers and repeatedly push quality control limits.150
Recent product recalls and safety scares in the United States involving
Chinese-made products have highlighted the fact that U.S. consumers are
paying for the lack of knowledge and accountability regarding the
manufacturing process in China.151 In 2007 alone, the CPSC recalled 473
different products; more than eighty percent were imported and seventy-four
percent of those imports came from China.152 Among these recalled products
were Chinese-made pet food, toothpaste, seafood products, tires, and toys.153 In
August of the same year, Mattel recalled 19 million Chinese-made toys that
were coated with excessive amounts of lead paint and contained unsafe
magnets.154 Most recently, in 2009, the CPSC identified defective drywall
made in China as problematic.155 Flaws in the United States and China
regarding oversight and accountability in the manufacturing industry mean
“the primary source of discovery will come in the worst possible way—by
consumers who buy Chinese products, only to discover their flaws
themselves.”156 While it may not be feasible to completely insulate U.S.
consumers from flawed Chinese products, consumers should, at the very least,
be able to turn to legal recourse for compensation if injured by such products.
II. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION
Dangerous Chinese-made products enter the U.S. stream of commerce and
injure consumers; however, U.S. victims are unable to sue the foreign
manufacturer responsible for production. There are three primary procedural
hurdles for plaintiffs attempting to collect on a U.S. judgment against a
Chinese manufacturer: (1) personal jurisdiction, (2) service of process, and (3)

150

Id. at 199.
HARNEY, supra note 56, at 185.
152 Memorandum from the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot. Staff to Members of the
Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot. 1–2 (June 11, 2010), available at http://democrats.
energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100612/Briefing.Memo.ctcp.06.16.2010.pdf.
153 Kayla Webley, List of Problem Chinese Imports Grows, NPR (July 10, 2007), http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyId=11656278.
154 Louise Story & David Barboza, Mattel Recalls 19 Million Toys Sent from China, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15,
2007), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=950CEEDB153FF936A2575BC0A9619C8B63&scp=
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enforcement of the judgment. These procedural obstacles are discussed in turn.
The U.S. Congress has noted the law’s shortcomings in the area of foreign
manufacturer liability and, in response to the numerous recalls of Chinese
products in 2007, passed the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of
2008 (“2008 Act”).157 The 2008 Act focuses on improving product safety in
the United States,158 but fails to hold foreign manufacturers liable for releasing
dangerous products in the U.S. stream of commerce. In an attempt to remedy
the shortcomings present in the 2008 Act, Ohio Representative Betty Sutton
introduced the Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act of 2010 in the
U.S. House of Representatives in February 2010; when the 2010 Act died in
committee, Sutton reintroduced the bill in December 2011.159 These proposed
items of legislation address personal jurisdiction and service of process as they
relate to foreign manufacturers, but fall short of providing a workable method
for enforcing U.S. judgments abroad.160
A. Personal Jurisdiction
Foreign manufacturer liability, although an unsettled area of the law, is not
a new legal issue. In 1987 the Supreme Court decided Asahi Metal Industry
Co. v. Superior Court, a distinguished products liability case involving a
Japanese defendant.161 The Court held that, to sue a foreign company in U.S.
court, the plaintiff must prove the defendant established minimum contacts in
the forum state such that the suit does not violate “traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.”162 The Court’s decision set forth a two-pronged
analysis for garnering jurisdiction: (1) the defendant’s purposeful minimum
contacts with the forum state, and (2) the fairness of subjecting the defendant
to personal jurisdiction in the forum state.163 Under the fairness prong, the
Court assessed a number of factors, including the burden a foreign company
faces in having to defend a suit in the United States.164 The Court held that,
based on the facts of the case, it was unreasonable for California to assert

157 Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-314, 122 Stat. 3016; Russell T.
Gips, Comment, From China with Lead: The Hasty Reform of the Consumer Product Safety Commission, 46
HOUS. L. REV. 545, 548 (2009).
158 See infra pp. 346–48, which discuss the 2008 Act.
159 See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text.
160 H.R. 3646, 112th Cong. §§ 3(a), 3(c)(1) (2011); H.R. 4678, 111th Cong. §§ 3(a), 3(c)(1) (2010).
161 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
162 Id. at 113–16.
163 Hearing—Leveling the Playing Field, supra note 9.
164 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113.
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jurisdiction over the foreign defendant.165 The Court failed to announce a
majority opinion under the purposeful availment prong, and the split decision
produced a confusing set of competing theories regarding what degree of
purposeful contact is required to satisfy due process.166
Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion states that merely placing a product in
the stream of commerce is insufficient to constitute purposeful contact.167
O’Connor’s opinion, often referred to as the “stream-of-commerce plus” test,
requires the foreign manufacturer to actively engage with the forum state.168
Unfortunately, this high burden has protected Chinese manufacturers from
lawsuits.169 Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion rejected O’Connor’s stream of
commerce theory and advocated for a standard based on the foreign
defendant’s “awareness” that the product might end up in the forum state: “As
long as a participant in this process is aware that the final product is being
marketed in the forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a
surprise.”170 Lower courts have been severely divided over the application of
the Asahi stream of commerce test.171
Although the jurisdictional threshold in domestic consumer products cases
is traditionally very low, in Asahi the Supreme Court “embraced an arguably
higher standard where the defendant is a foreign party.”172 The complex
minimum contacts analysis and the Court’s failure to articulate a purposeful
165

Id. at 116.
Raymond L. Mariani, U.S. Supreme Court To Revisit Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign
Manufacturers, NIXON PEABODY (Nov. 16, 2010), http://www.nixonpeabody.com/linked_media/publications/
Products_Alert_11_16_2010.pdf.
167 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (O’Connor, J., plurality). In contrast, Justice Brennan rejected the part of
Justice O’Connor’s opinion that required conduct in addition to placing the product in the stream of commerce.
Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., plurality). Brennan argued that as long as the defendant is aware that the final product
is being marketed in the forum state, jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause. Id.
168 E.g., Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., 987 A.2d 575, 586 (N.J. 2010).
169 One commentator has argued that Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Asahi “has made it virtually
impossible for an injured plaintiff to sue a component parts manufacturer in any state or country other than its
place of domicile or the state or country where delivery of the component part is made to a product
assembler.” Christine M. Wiseman, Reconstructing the Citadel: The Advent of Jurisdictional Privity, 54 OHIO
ST. L.J. 403, 404 (1993).
170 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117.
171 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 139 (3d ed. 1996);
Robert C. Neff, After Asahi: Forging a New Personal Jurisdiction Standard, MARTINDALE.COM (May 24,
2010), http://www.martindale.com/products-liability-law/article_Wilson-Elser-Moskowitz-Edelman-Dicker_
1032600.htm. Some lower courts have created their own hybrid of the O’Connor and Brennan theories
regarding the stream of commerce test. Id.
172 Jacques Delisle & Elizabeth Trujillo, Consumer Protection in Transnational Contexts, 58 AM. J.
COMP. L. 135, 138 (2010).
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availment requirement has allowed foreign defendants to escape jurisdiction
and thus liability for dangerous and defective products sold in the United
States. Most Chinese companies strategically structure their businesses using
independent importers and distributors in an effort to reduce their exposure to
lawsuits.173 Chinese manufacturers argue that they do not purposefully conduct
business in the forum state, leaving legal liability on the shoulders of the U.S.
importers, distributors, and retailers. Chinese manufacturers enjoy economic
benefits from the sale of their products in the United States, but are insulated
from the legal and economic ramifications created when their products cause
harm. Globalization and the resulting international marketplace have called
into question the effectiveness of the Asahi jurisdictional test. The Supreme
Court, agreeing this issue was ripe for discussion, granted certiorari in two
cases addressing jurisdiction over foreign manufacturers in the context of a
global economy.174
On June 27, 2011, the Supreme Court issued decisions in two cases that
had the potential to vastly expand the scope of products liability suits in U.S.
state courts against foreign manufacturers.175 Unfortunately, the outcomes of
both cases will likely bar future products liability lawsuits against foreign
manufacturers who have little or no contact with the forum state.176 Both cases
raised questions regarding when U.S. courts, in accordance with the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause, may hear claims arising from injuries
sustained by products manufactured and placed in the stream of commerce by
multinational corporations.177 In J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, the
question presented was whether the state of New Jersey may exercise in
personam jurisdiction178 over a foreign manufacturer when the manufacturer
targets the U.S. market in general for the sale of the product.179 J. McIntyre, a
company incorporated in the United Kingdom, manufactured machinery and
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Hearing—Leveling the Playing Field, supra note 9, at 4.
Sean Wajert, Supreme Court Grants Cert in Important Personal Jurisdiction Cases, MASS TORT DEF.
(Oct. 7, 2010), http://www.masstortdefense.com/2010/10/articles/supreme-court-grants-cert-in-importantpersonal-jurisdiction-cases.
175 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A.
v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
176 Eric C. Strain, Personal Jurisdiction: Is No News from the Supreme Court Good News for Foreign
Product Manufacturers?, NIXON PEABODY (June 30, 2011), http://www.nixonpeabody.com/linked_media/
publications/Products_Alert_06_30_2011.pdf.
177 Trooboff, supra note 17.
178 A court has in personam, or specific, jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant if the claim arises out
of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state. RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 40–41 (2d ed. 2009).
179 Mariani, supra note 166.
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used a U.S. distributor (based in Ohio) to sell its products in the United
States.180 J. McIntyre never sold its machines to buyers in the United States
beyond its U.S. distributor, never marketed goods in New Jersey, and never
shipped goods directly to New Jersey.181 No more than four of J. McIntyre’s
machines ended up in New Jersey.182 J. McIntyre officials did attend annual
conventions in the United States for the scrap metal recycling industry;
however, none of these conventions took place in New Jersey.183 An employee
of a New Jersey scrap metal company lost four fingers as a result of an
accident involving a metal-cutting machine manufactured by J. McIntyre.184
The employee, a resident of New Jersey, brought a products liability action
against J. McIntyre in New Jersey state court.185 J. McIntyre argued, consistent
with Asahi, that the state cannot assert personal jurisdiction when the product
causing harm entered the state through the stream of commerce unless the
foreign entity purposefully availed itself to the benefits of the forum state.186
The New Jersey Supreme Court issued an opinion, characterized as an
“unprecedented expansion of personal jurisdiction,”187 in which the divided
court held that when a foreign manufacturer places an allegedly defective
product in the stream of commerce that targets the U.S. market and a New
Jersey consumer purchases that product, the manufacturer is subject to
personal jurisdiction in New Jersey.188 The court conducted an extensive
analysis of Asahi in the context of a globalized economy and ultimately
applied a stream of commerce test that comported with Justice Brennan’s
“awareness” standard in Asahi.189 The court found it significant that “our
nation is a global economy driven by startling advances in the transportation of
products and people.”190 The court recognized the impact of globalization, and
its holding reflects a shift in the law to account for the dramatic changes in
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187 Id.
188 Nicastro, 987 A.2d at 592.
189 Id. at 589.
190 Id. at 582.
181
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international commerce—reflecting the new reality of a contemporary global
economy.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the New Jersey Supreme Court and held
6-3 that personal jurisdiction did not exist in this particular products liability
case. However, there was no majority opinion on the applicable rule of law to
be applied in similar situations.191 The Court held that no stream of commerce
doctrine can displace the general rule, which requires that a manufacturer is
subject to jurisdiction only if it purposefully avails itself of the privileges of
conducting activities within the forum state.192 In this case, J. McIntyre did not
have a single contact with New Jersey other than the fact that the product in
question ended up there; therefore, the Court reasoned, it had not purposefully
availed itself of the New Jersey market.193 Justice Kennedy, writing for a
plurality of four justices, adhered to O’Connor’s concurrence in Asahi, in
which she wrote that placement of a product into the stream of commerce, on
its own, does not constitute purposeful action by the defendant directed toward
the forum state.194 Applying this standard, Kennedy opined that jurisdiction
over J. McIntyre was improper because, while J. McIntyre may have intended
to serve the U.S. market generally, there was no evidence of any actions
leading to purposeful availment of the New Jersey market specifically.195
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Alito, filed a concurrence in which he
agreed with the ruling, but argued it was “unwise to announce a rule of broad
applicability” at this time, given that the case failed to address recent advances
in commerce and communication.196 Breyer relied on precedent and felt that
the case should be decided narrowly and limited to its facts.197 He found this
particular case an unsuitable vehicle for making extensive pronouncements that
“refashion basic jurisdictional rules.”198 Although Breyer declined to overturn
191

J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2791 (2011) (Kennedy, J., plurality); John
Maley, Editorial: Personal Jurisdiction Theories Still Evolving, IND. LAW. (Aug. 3, 2011), http://www.
theindianalawyer.com/article/print?articleId=26858.
192 J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2785 (Kennedy, J., plurality).
193 Id. at 2790.
194 Id. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring). Kennedy disagreed with Justice Brennan’s opinion in Asahi, which
argued that jurisdiction can be based simply on placing a product into the stream of commerce, so long as the
defendant is aware that the product is being marketed in the forum state and “the possibility of a lawsuit there
cannot come as a surprise.” Id. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., plurality).
195 Id. at 2790–91 (Kennedy, J., plurality).
196 Id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring).
197 Id.
198 Id.; see also Esther H. Lim, No Personal Jurisdiction Exists over a Foreign Party Because Simply
Placing Goods in the Stream of Commerce, Without More, Is Not an Act Purposefully Directed to the Forum
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Asahi at this opportunity, he acknowledged that the global economy might
require a reexamination of the Court’s precedents.199
Justice Ginsburg, joined by two other justices, strongly disagreed with the
fractured majority.200 Ginsburg felt J. McIntyre’s goal was to “simply sell as
much as it can, wherever it can.”201 She opined that jurisdiction could be
properly exercised over J. McIntyre based on the manufacturer’s efforts to
distribute products in the United States generally.202 Ginsburg wrote,
“McIntyre UK, by engaging McIntyre America to promote and sell its
machines in the United States, purposefully availed itself of the United States
market nationwide . . . . McIntyre UK thereby availed itself of the market of all
States in which its products were sold by its exclusive distributor.”203 Ginsburg
feared that “the Court’s decision would allow foreign manufacturers to insulate
themselves from products liability litigation in the U.S. by engaging a U.S.
distributor to ship its goods throughout the U.S. market.”204 She warned that
the Court’s decision might prevent U.S. states from protecting their citizens
from defective products.205
In Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, the Supreme Court
addressed whether a foreign corporation is subject to general jurisdiction when
the particular product at issue did not enter the forum state, but other similar
products did.206 In 2004, two thirteen-year-old boys from North Carolina died
in a bus accident outside of Paris, France.207 The complaint alleged that a
flawed Goodyear tire caused the incident.208 The administrators of the boys’
estates brought suit against Goodyear subsidiaries, located abroad, in North

State, FINNEGAN (July 2011), http://www.finnegan.com/files/upload/Newsletters/Last_Month_at_the_Federal_
Circuit/2011/July/FCN_Jul11_4.html.
199 Beth S. Rose & Charles J. Falletta, U.S. Supreme Court Reversed New Jersey’s Exercise of Personal
Jurisdiction over Foreign Manufacturer, NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 5, 2011), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/
us-supreme-court-reverses-new-jersey-s-exercise-personal-jurisdiction-over-foreign-manufac-2.
200 J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2794–2804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
201 Id. at 2794.
202 Id. at 2801.
203 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
204 Rose & Falletta, supra note 199.
205 Id.
206 Mariani, supra note 166.
207 Brown v. Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382, 384 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009).
208 Id.
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Carolina state court.209 The suit claimed Goodyear tires were defectively
manufactured and subsequently caused the accident.210
The dispute in this case did not arise from Goodyear’s contacts with North
Carolina.211 The tires in question were manufactured overseas and the accident
occurred in France. Therefore, general rather than specific jurisdiction was at
issue. General jurisdiction is permissible when the defendant’s contacts with
the state are unrelated to the cause of action, but the defendant’s activities with
the state are sufficiently “continuous and systematic” to permit jurisdiction
over the defendant.212 The North Carolina Court of Appeals found jurisdiction
was permissible over Goodyear subsidiaries that were located abroad and that
manufactured tires for sale in the United States.213 The court acknowledged the
defendants operated a continuous and highly organized U.S.-based sales and
distribution network.214 Goodyear subsidiaries manufactured thousands of tires
that were distributed in North Carolina.215 The court held jurisdiction was
proper because the foreign subsidiaries could have reasonably expected to be
sued in North Carolina court based on their continuous sale of tires in the
United States.216
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the North Carolina
Court of Appeals.217 In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the three
foreign subsidiaries of Goodyear were not subject to personal jurisdiction in
North Carolina state court.218 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, stated
that general jurisdiction could not be based on the fact that some of the tires
Goodyear subsidiaries manufactured abroad entered North Carolina through
the stream of commerce.219 She explained that such a tenuous connection with
the state did not establish the requisite “continuous and systematic” affiliation
that would allow North Carolina to exercise general jurisdiction.220 Ginsburg
explained that “flow of a manufacturer’s products into the forum . . . may

209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220

Id.
Id.
Id. at 387.
Id. at 388 (quoting Skinner v. Preferred Credit, 361 N.C. 114, 122 (2006)).
Id. at 395.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 394.
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2858 (2011).
Id. at 2857.
Id. at 2855–56.
Id. at 2856.
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bolster an affiliation germane to specific jurisdiction . . . but ties serving to
bolster the exercise of specific jurisdiction do not warrant a determination that,
based on those ties, the forum has general jurisdiction over a defendant.”221
Almost twenty-five years after its decision in Asahi, the Supreme Court had
the opportunity to revisit the decision and to amend or overrule the judgment,
which is now inadequate because it fails to protect U.S. consumers from
defective foreign-made products sold in the United States. The Court clarified
the general jurisdiction standard in Goodyear but punted when it came time to
issue a framework for specific jurisdiction in J. McIntyre.222 The stream of
commerce theory “remains unsettled at best” after J. McIntyre,223 and the
fractured opinion virtually ensures there will be future decisions from the
Court on this issue as both federal and state courts wrestle with the impact of
globalized commerce on products liability lawsuits.224 Unfortunately, the Court
missed an opportunity to issue a definitive statement on questions regarding
the jurisdictional reach of U.S. courts in products liability cases and the
ramifications of the split decision in Asahi remain virtually unaltered.225 The
Court declined to expand the jurisdictional reach of state courts based on a
foreign defendant’s nationwide contacts; therefore, it will be more difficult for
plaintiffs to succeed on a pure stream of commerce theory against foreign
manufacturers.226 Raising the bar for personal jurisdiction will undoubtedly
hurt U.S. consumers who are injured by products manufactured abroad and
sold in the United States.227 Thomas L. Gowen, a partner at the Locks Law
Firm in Philadelphia, commented on the decisions: “Basically the Supreme
Court has given corporations a roadmap for avoiding responsibility.”228 The
Court has allowed foreign manufacturers to insulate themselves by using
middlemen in their distribution chains and by targeting the U.S. market while
claiming they have no knowledge of precisely where their products will be
sold.

221

Id. at 2855 (emphasis in original).
See Atkins, supra note 25.
223 Maley, supra note 191.
224 John C. Maloney & Florice E. Pressman, The Supreme Court Protects Foreign Manufacturers in the
Stream of Global Commerce, MARTINDALE.COM (July 20, 2011), http://www.martindale.com/productsliability-law/article_Day-Pitney-LLP_1316130.htm.
225 Strain, supra note 176.
226 Id.
227 Atkins, supra note 25.
228 Id.
222
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B. Service of Process
Personal jurisdiction is merely the first procedural hurdle a plaintiff must
overcome in a suit against a foreign manufacturer. Once a plaintiff has
garnered personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the plaintiff must properly
serve the defendant, thereby providing notification of the charge.229 The United
States and China have not executed a bilateral treaty governing service of
process; therefore, the Hague Convention on the Service of Process Abroad of
Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters230
governs.231 Article 2 of the convention requires each contracting state to
designate a Central Authority, which will undertake to receive requests for
service.232 Under Article 5, “[t]he Central Authority of the State addressed
shall itself serve the document or shall arrange to have it served by an
appropriate agency.”233 A U.S. plaintiff bears the cost of having the Central
Authority in China serve notice as well as the cost of translating the document
from English to Chinese, which often amounts to thousands of dollars.234 Due
to complex supply chains and collusion between government and factory
owners, Chinese authorities often fail to serve process or cannot locate the
accused company because it has dissolved or changed ownership.235 The lack
of a registered agent for service of process in the United States is problematic
and encourages plaintiffs to sue U.S. defendants when such an option is
available.236

229

FREER, supra note 178, at 40–41; see also Hearing—Leveling the Playing Field, supra note 9, at 4.
Hague Convention on the Service of Process Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil
and Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 658 U.N.T.S. 163.
231 Daniel Griswold & Sallie James, Consumer Safety Bill Could Boomerang Against U.S. Manufacturers,
FREE TRADE BULL., Sept. 28, 2010, at 1, available at http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=12174.
The United States ratified the convention in 1969. BORN, supra note 171, at 797. China became a member in
1991. Id.
232 Hague Convention on the Service of Process Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil
and Commercial Matters, supra note 228, art. 5.
233 Id.
234 Hearing—Leveling the Playing Field, supra note 9, at 4.
235 Dan Harris, Chinese Drywall Litigation and Why Seizing Assets Is Very Different from Seizing Ships,
CHINA L. BLOG (Feb. 28, 2010), http://www.chinalawblog.com/2010/02/chinese_drywall_and_the_halfas.
html.
236 See Hearing on H.R. 4678, the “Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act” Before the H.
Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot., 111th Cong. 2 (2010) [hereinafter Hearing—H.R. 4678]
(statement of Jeremy Baskin, Import Surveillance Division, Office of Compliance, U.S. Consumer Product
Safety Commission).
230
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C. Enforcement
Enforcement of a U.S. judgment in China is the most formidable obstacle
an injured U.S. consumer faces. Even if plaintiffs can garner jurisdiction over
the manufacturer and properly serve the company, the judgment is meaningless
until the injured consumer receives financial compensation. Although a
plaintiff could enforce the judgment if a Chinese company had assets in the
United States, or in another country that generally enforces U.S. judgments,
Chinese manufacturers rarely have assets outside of China.237 Article 267 of
the Chinese Civil Procedure Law mandates the existence of a treaty or de facto
reciprocity to enforce a foreign judgment in China—neither exists between the
United States and China.238
Because no such United States–China treaty exists, the only potential
enforcement mechanism at present is reciprocity.239 Reciprocity is based on the
theory that if the United States is willing to enforce Chinese judgments, China
would be willing to enforce U.S. judgments.240 In 2009, the Central District of
California upheld a judgment against Robinson Helicopters, issued by a
Chinese court, under California’s Uniform Money Judgments Recognition
Act.241 Although enforcement of a single Chinese judgment does not create
reciprocity, the United States has demonstrated that it will enforce Chinese
decisions that are “final, conclusive, and enforceable.”242 China has yet to
reciprocate.243 Granting greater recognition to Chinese judgments in the United
237

Hearing—Leveling the Playing Field, supra note 9, at 4.
Donald C. Clarke, The Enforcement of United States Court Judgments in China: A Research Note 1–2
(George Washington Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 236, 2004), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=943922.
239 Id. at 2–3.
240 See Di Er Bai Liu Shi Wu Tiao (
) [Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of
China, Article 265], (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2007, effective April
9, 1991), available at P.R.C. LAWS, http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=6459&lib=law. Under
PRC Law, “[i]f a legally effective judgment or ruling made by a foreign court seeks the recognition and
enforcement of a people’s court of the People’s Republic of China, . . . the foreign court may, according to the
provisions of the international treaties concluded or acceded to by the People’s Republic of China or based on
the principle of reciprocity, request the recognition and enforcement of a people’s court.” Id.
241 Hubei Gezhouba Sanlian Indus. v. Robinson Helicopter Co., No. 2:06-cv-01798-FMC-SSx, 2009 WL
2190187 (C.D. Cal. July 22, 2009).
242 Id. at *5. A civil suit for recognition of a foreign judgment may be heard under federal law if the
foreign judgment is “final, conclusive and enforceable.” Id.
243 See Zhang Shouzhi et al., Forum Shopping for Dispute Resolution, KING & WOOD, http://www.
kingandwood.com/article.aspx?id=Forum-Shopping-for-Dispute-Resolution-Hurdles-and-Solutions&
language=en (last visited Mar. 10, 2012). Chinese courts do not presume China has reciprocal interests with
other countries, and China has not acceded to any multilateral treaties that allow it to mutually recognize and
enforce court judgments rendered in other countries. Id. “In short, if there is no applicable bilateral treaty
238
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States would not require courts in China to offer the same recognition to
American decisions.244 Reciprocity is built on mutual respect for each other’s
legal systems and a desire to nurture and protect the relationship between the
two countries. Such an understanding does not yet exist between China and the
United States.245
Under U.S. customs law, the U.S. importer of record (the owner or
purchaser of the goods) is charged with the legal responsibility of ensuring
goods enter the United States in compliance with all federal laws.246 U.S.
products liability law has expanded liability to encompass not only
manufacturers, but distributors and sellers as well.247 A consumer injured by a
defective product in the United States can bring suit against anyone in the
supply chain—from the manufacturer to the importer or retailer. Due to the
procedural mechanisms presently in place, a U.S. plaintiff would save time and
money bringing suit against a domestic defendant rather than a Chinese
manufacturer.248 Furthermore, the plaintiff is considerably more likely to
receive economic compensation in a domestic suit, given the fact that China
has never before enforced a U.S. judgment.249
The United States is presently grappling with the law’s procedural
shortcomings regarding protection for consumers who are injured by foreignmade products. The fact that the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in two
cases in this area indicates the severity of the law’s imperfections.
Unfortunately, effective economic compensation for injured U.S. consumers
remains elusive. Even if jurisdiction and service of process are possible, no
solution currently exists regarding enforcement of the judgment. A fund
designated to reimburse injured U.S. consumers would circumvent the law’s
inability to force China to honor U.S. judgments. Manufacturers responsible
for dangerous exports would be required to contribute to the fund,250 thereby
providing mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments between the forum state and China, judgments
rendered in the forum state will not be recognized and enforced by Chinese courts.” Id.
244 Harris, supra note 235.
245 Eric Stone, the former director of the CPSC Legal Division, Office of Compliance and Field
Operations, notes that “[w]e are not yet at a point in our international jurisprudence where each country is
willing to participate in another’s legal processes.” Kessler & Sapien, supra note 1.
246 19 U.S.C. § 1484(a) (2006).
247 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 10, § 1.
248 Hearing—Leveling the Playing Field, supra note 9, at 4.
249 See Shouzhi et al., supra note 243.
250 If a manufacturer produced a product that injured a U.S. citizen and failed to compensate the victim,
the manufacturer would be required to contribute to the fund as a condition of continuing to export to the
United States.
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providing the economic incentive that the law lacks to incite Chinese
manufacturers to monitor the quality and safety of their products. At the same
time, the fund would provide a mechanism for injured consumers to enjoy the
monetary compensation they deserve. Procedural amendments like those the
Supreme Court considered in J. McIntyre and Goodyear should be welcomed,
but will not alone resolve the law’s shortcomings.
Efforts to amend foreign manufacturer liability law in the United States
have not been limited to judicial activism. The U.S. Congress has attempted to
address liability of foreign manufacturers through legislative action. A
combination of government agency regulations and Congressional legislation
demonstrates the ongoing significance of the issue. Unfortunately, such
legislative efforts have been largely ineffective.
D. Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008
On August 14, 2008, in response to the massive recalls of Chinese products
in 2007, the U.S. Congress passed the Consumer Product Safety Improvement
Act of 2008 (“CPSIA”).251 The bill was a bipartisan effort enacted to protect
U.S. consumers from defective products.252 The 2008 Act modified the
Consumer Product Safety Act, which Congress passed in 1972 as a response to
the lack of nationwide comprehensive consumer product safety regulation.253
The Consumer Product Safety Act created the CPSC, an independent
government agency “charged with protecting the public from unreasonable
risks of injury or death from thousands of types of consumer products under
the agency’s jurisdiction.”254 The Consumer Product Safety Act grants the
CPSC the power to set mandatory product safety standards, ban dangerous
products from the marketplace, order product recalls, and levy fines against
violators.255 Despite the CPSC’s enforcement powers, in 2007 it was

251 Gips, supra note 157, at 568–69; Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-314, 122 Stat. 3016 (2008).
252 Eileen Flaherty, Note, Safety First: The Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, 21 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 372, 384 (2009).
253 Gips, supra note 157, at 549.
254 CPSC Overview, U.S. CONSUMER PROTECTION SAFETY COMMISSION, http://www.cpsc.gov/about/
about.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2010).
255 CHARLES W. LAMB ET AL., MARKETING 113 (10th ed. 2009).
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understaffed, underfunded, and charged with regulating an ever-increasing
number of imported goods.256
The 2007 product recalls exposed the shortcomings of the U.S. product
safety system and made it clear U.S. consumer safety laws needed reform.257
The CPSIA, which focuses on improving product safety, requires toys and
infant products to be tested before they are sold, and mandates permissible
limits for lead.258 The CPSIA protects whistleblowers, increases CPSC
resources, and increases the civil and criminal penalties the CPSC can assess
against violators.259 The CPSIA also created the first comprehensive, publicly
accessible consumer complaint database, which identifies and updates
information regarding hazardous products.260
One obstacle the CPSIA fails to address adequately is the challenge posed
by the sheer number of products the United States imports. The United States
Customs and Border Patrol (“CBP”) is charged with safeguarding U.S. borders
and facilitating the flow of trade, which includes ensuring that goods arriving
in the United States are safe for consumer consumption.261 On a typical day the
CBP processes 70,900 truck, rail, and sea containers at 326 ports of entry.262
Following the enactment of the CPSIA, the CPSC partnered with the CBP staff
to leverage joint resources and increase inspection of products entering the
United States.263 The CBP and CPSC executed a Memorandum of
Understanding allowing CPSC inspectors to target suspect shipments before
they arrive and intercept potentially hazardous goods prior to entering the U.S.
stream of commerce.264
256 Id. “From 1998 to 2007, the value of consumer products imported into the United States increased over
100 percent.” Hearing—H.R. 4678, supra note 236 (statement of Jeremy Baskin, Import Surveillance Division,
Office of Compliance, U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission).
257 Hearing—H.R. 4678, supra note 236 (statement of Ami V. Gadhia, Policy Counsel, Consumers
Union).
258 Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-314, §§ 101–102, 122 Stat.
3016, 3017–28.
259 Id. § 217. A civil penalty of $100,000 is imposed for each violation of the CPSIA and a maximum of
$15 million for any related series of violations. A maximum five-year sentence will be imposed for knowingly
and willfully violating consumer product safety laws. Id.
260 Id. § 212.
261 See CBP Mission Statement and Core Values, CBP.GOV (Feb. 17, 2009), http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/
about/mission/guardians.xml.
262 U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., SNAPSHOT: A SUMMARY OF CBP FACTS AND FIGURES 1 (2007),
available at http://www.phpintl.com/PDF%20Files/cbp_snapshot_final.pdf.
263 Hearing—H.R. 4678, supra note 236 (statement of Jeremy Baskin, Import Surveillance Division,
Office of Compliance, U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission).
264 Id.
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In 2007, at the port of Los Angeles, which receives 15 million truck-sized
containers a year, a single CPSC inspector would spot-check incoming
shipments two or three days a week.265 While CBP agents help inspect imports,
they are often looking for counterfeit goods, not necessarily products that fail
to comply with safety standards.266 The number of port inspectors the agency
has implemented since the CPSIA is negligible,267 exemplifying that postCPSIA, budget and personnel remain inadequate to ensure the safety of
imported products. Today, the vast majority of imported cargo enters the
United States without being screened.268 Despite efforts to the contrary,
defective Chinese-made products will elude border protection and enter into
the U.S. stream of commerce. Consumers should be able to rely on U.S. law to
provide a remedy for injuries resulting from these defective products.
The CPSIA’s most significant shortcoming is its failure to address how to
hold foreign manufacturers liable for introducing dangerous products into the
U.S. marketplace. In her testimony before the House Subcommittee on Energy,
Trade, and Consumer Protection, Ami Gadhia, policy counsel for the
Consumers Union, acknowledged the CPSIA has “made great strides in
improving product safety,” but noted that the law “does not address bringing
foreign manufacturers into our civil justice system.”269 Gadhia argued,
“American consumers must be able to hold manufacturers accountable when
they are harmed—no matter where the products are made.”270 Gadhia’s
testimony was offered in support of the Foreign Manufacturers Legal
Accountability Act of 2010.271 Although the 2010 Act expired with its
Congressional session, Gadhia’s testimony successfully highlighted the
loopholes and deficiencies of the CPSIA.272 The CPSIA lacks a mechanism to
punish manufacturers; therefore, manufacturers lack the incentive to comply
with U.S. product safety laws.

265

Eric Lipton, Safety Agency Faces Scrutiny amid Changes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2007, at A1.
Id.
267 Hearing—H.R. 4678, supra note 236 (statement of Jeremy Baskin, Import Surveillance Division,
Office of Compliance, U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission).
268 See Lipton, supra note 265.
269 Hearing—H.R. 4678, supra note 236 (statement of Ami V. Gadhia, Policy Counsel, Consumers
Union).
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 See id.
266
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E. Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Acts of 2010 and 2011
The CPSIA’s failure to enforce penalties against foreign manufacturers has
left the door open for additional legislation in this area of the law. In response
to concerns about Chinese-made products, particularly defective drywall, Ohio
Democrat Betty Sutton introduced the Foreign Manufacturers Legal
Accountability Act of 2010 in the U.S. House of Representatives in February
2010.273 Sutton’s position is that “the current system makes it difficult to sue
shadowy companies that export toxic drywall, faulty infant cribs or children’s
toys containing lead paint. . . . We cannot allow foreign manufacturers to
continue to undercut U.S. manufacturers by disregarding the safety of their
products, thereby endangering our consumers and costing us jobs.”274 The
2010 Act was approved in July 2010 by the House Energy and Commerce
Committee, but died in committee.275 The bill was reintroduced as the Foreign
Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act of 2011 in December 2011; the 2011
Act is in committee as of this writing.276
The 2011 Act would require foreign manufacturers who export products to
the U.S. market to establish a registered agent in the United States authorized
to accept service of process against the manufacturer.277 By registering an
agent, the foreign manufacturer would thereby consent to jurisdiction of the
state and federal courts of the state in which the agent is located for any civil or
regulatory proceedings.278 If a foreign manufacturer fails to designate a
registered agent in the United States, the 2011 Act would ban the importation
of any goods produced by the manufacturer.279 The proposed legislation would
apply to “covered products” regulated by federal agencies.280 Section 2(3) of
273

H.R. 4678, 111th Cong. (2010).
Ian Swanson, Import Ban Bill Has Manufacturers Worried, HILL (Sept. 13, 2010, 5:00 AM), http://
thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/118257-import-ban-bill-has-manufacturers-worried.
275 See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.
276 See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.
277 H.R. 3646, 112th Cong. §§ 3(a), 3(c)(1) (2011); see also Daniel Griswold, Chinese Drywall Maker
Held Accountable Without Congressional Meddling, CATO LIBERTY (Oct. 15, 2010, 2:37 PM), http://www.
cato-at-liberty.org/chinese-drywall-maker-held-accountable-without-congressional-meddling (discussing the
2010 Act). The agent must be registered in a state with “substantial connection to the importation, distribution,
or sale of the products of the foreign manufacturer or producer” such that the minimum contacts test is
satisfied and service is appropriate. H.R. 3646 § 3(a)(2)(A). A 2009 companion bill in the Senate, sponsored
by Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, died following introduction. S. 1606: Foreign Manufacturers Legal
Accountability Act of 2009, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-1606 (last
visited Mar. 20, 2012).
278 H.R. 3646 § 3(c).
279 Id. § 4(a).
280 Id. § 3(c).
274
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the 2011 Act defines the term “covered product,” which includes drugs and
cosmetics, biological products, consumer products, chemical substances, and
pesticides.281
The impetus behind the 2010 and 2011 Acts stems from the failure of
previous legislation to ensure compensation from foreign manufacturers for
U.S. consumers who are injured by defective foreign-made products.282 The
Chinese drywall debacle has bolstered the belief that U.S. consumers
“damaged by faulty products, whether made abroad or domestically, should be
able to seek compensation through the courts.”283 By making consent to
jurisdiction and service of process a condition of importing products into the
United States,284 the 2011 Act, if passed, would eliminate two of the
procedural hurdles presently in place. However, the 2011 Act’s fatal flaw is its
failure to address enforcement, the third and most important procedural hurdle.
Daniel Griswold, the director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato
Institute and Sallie James, a trade policy analyst at the Cato Institute, noted in
regards to the 2010 Act:
Requiring foreign companies like the Chinese drywall producer to
designate a legal representative in the United States would not
guarantee collection of damages from the producer. . . . Merely
having a designated agent in the United States would not guarantee
access to the resources of the original manufacturer to pay for the
285
damages ultimately awarded in a court case.

Enactment of the 2011 Act is unlikely to incentivize Chinese manufacturers to
enforce U.S. court judgments. Manufacturers will likely appoint a “fall man”
to accept service of process in the United States and subsequently refuse
enforcement. The 2011 Act is a unilateral action on behalf of the United States
and, as previously discussed, China is under no legal obligation to
acknowledge or enforce U.S. judgments.286

281

Id.
See Press Release, Am. Ass’n for Just., Legislation Would Aid Consumers in Holding Foreign
Manufacturers Accountable for Dangerous Products (Aug. 7, 2009), available at http://www.justice.org/cps/
rde/xchg/justice/hs.xsl/10192.htm.
283 Griswold & James, supra note 231.
284 H.R. 3646 § 3(a).
285 Griswold & James, supra note 231.
286 See supra text accompanying notes 238–44.
282
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Critics of the 2010 and 2011 Acts describe the legislation as
protectionist.287 Canadian Ambassador Gary Doer argued, in regards to the
2010 Act, that the legislation would have given an unfair trade advantage to
U.S. firms, who are not required to appoint an agent, thereby violating the
World Trade Organization and North American Free Trade Agreement
Rules.288 Small and mid-sized businesses that are unable to afford hiring an
agent in the United States would be cut out of the U.S. market by the 2011
Act’s passage.289 In a letter written to Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi,
Doer argued that the 2010 Act, then still in committee, would have added
another logistical and administrative requirement, thereby interfering with
trade across the border.290 Treaties between the United States and Canada
allow U.S. plaintiffs to bring suit against Canadian manufacturers and
Canadian courts routinely enforce American court judgments where
jurisdiction and due process is proper.291 The intent of the 2010 and 2011 Acts
is to make jurisdiction and service of process over foreign manufacturers easier
for U.S. plaintiffs.292 Because neither jurisdiction nor service of process over
Canadian manufacturers is problematic, the 2011 Act, as applied to Canada,
would be redundant and would impose additional procedural constraints to
maintain current levels of trade between the two nations.
Criticisms of the 2010 Act were not limited to cries of protectionism.293
The proposed law, opponents argued, might have encouraged similar
retaliatory legislation from other countries, which would have a negative
impact on U.S. exporters.294 Additionally, costly registration requirements in
the event of the 2011 Act’s passage could force some foreign manufacturers to
exit the market, thereby limiting options for U.S. consumers.295 While the 2011
Act, if passed, will apply equally to all U.S. trading partners, the enhanced
287 See Tom Ramstack, Foreign Countries Upset About “Protectionist” U.S. Trade Bill, DAILY HR
TIPS.COM (Sept.
21,
2010),
http://www.dailyhrtips.com/2010/09/21/foreign-countries-upset-aboutprotectionist-u-s-trade-bill.
288 Id. U.S. sponsors argued that the 2010 Act fell under the exception to WTO fair trade rules that protect
life and health. Id.
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 See supra text accompanying notes 231–37.
293 Andrew Mayeda, U.S. Bill “Badly Crafted,” Trade Minister Says, EDMONTON J. (Sept. 24, 2010),
http://www2.canada.com/edmontonjournal/news/business/story.html?id=21fe7957-61b4-40aa-a175-9f28d
b18a78a.
294 Griswold & James, supra note 231.
295 Id.; Hearing–H.R. 4678, supra note 236 (statement of Marianne Rowden, President & CEO, American
Association of Exporters and Importers).

GLYNN GALLEYSPROOFS.2

352

6/28/2012 10:33 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

restrictions appear to specifically target Chinese manufacturers. Such targeted
legislation runs the risk of escalating chronic bilateral trade frictions between
the United States and China.296
Pritam Banerjee, the Head of Trade and International Policy at the
Confederation of Indian Industry, felt the 2010 Act was unnecessary
supplemental legislation designed to satisfy protectionist supporters.297
Banerjee argued the CPSIA “already provides more than adequate protection
to the U.S. consumer by requiring producers to test and verify that products
entering the United States conform to U.S. standards before they are imported
into the country.”298 As previously discussed, budget and personnel issues, and
the sheer number of U.S. imports, mean most imported cargo enters the United
States without inspection.299 As a result, U.S. consumers who purchase flawed
Chinese-made products are typically the first to discover the defects in the
products.300
Other critics of the 2010 Act argued that the existing legal system, which
allows plaintiffs to bring suit against U.S. importers, distributors, and retailers,
works reasonably well and provides adequate compensation for U.S.
consumers.301 As previously discussed, this framework shields Chinese
manufacturers from liability and shifts the entire cost of legal responsibility to
U.S. players in the supply chain.302 Simply augmenting the legal penalties
imposed against domestic partners of foreign producers lets China off the hook
and allows the Chinese to benefit economically from exports to the United
States without internalizing any costs of harm.303 Additionally, the current
system fails to protect consumers who are unable to sue U.S. parties. The
creation of a fund would protect those consumers and work to close the
loophole in the existing framework.
Products liability ensures “that the costs of injuries resulting from defective
products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market
296

Delisle & Trujillo, supra note 172, at 162.
Pritam Banerjee, The Foreign Manufacturers Liability and Accountability Act: A Major Concern for
Indian Exporters to the US, WORLD COM. REV., http://worldcommercereview.com/publications/article_pdf/
294 (last visited Mar. 3, 2012).
298 Id.
299 See supra text accompanying notes 266–69.
300 Shoddy Work, supra note 89.
301 See Griswold & James, supra note 231.
302 See supra text accompanying notes 84–87.
303 See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Andrew T. Guzman, Keeping Imports Safe: A Proposal for
Discriminatory Regulation of International Trade, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1405, 1410 (2008).
297
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rather than by injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.”304
Under the present system, if U.S. consumers are harmed by a defective
Chinese-made product and are unable to sue a party in the United States, they
are left without legal recourse.305 An innocent U.S. consumer who
unknowingly buys a house constructed with defective Chinese-made drywall
will receive no legal or economic compensation from the manufacturer
responsible for the faulty product.306 The problem the 2010 and 2011 Acts
were designed to address is real; however, the proposed legislation alone is not
the answer. As discussed in reference to the relevant Supreme Court cases, J.
McIntyre and Goodyear, expanded jurisdiction and service of process will be
of little significance if China refuses to recognize U.S. judgments.307 The 2011
Act fails to provide an adequate mechanism for ensuring reimbursement for
consumers who have been injured by foreign manufacturers. Like those of the
judiciary, legislative attempts to combat liability of foreign manufacturers have
fallen short of protecting injured consumers. The fund concept is a solution
that bypasses the legal obstructions and delves into the heart of the problem—
economic compensation.
III. THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA MOVING FORWARD—IMPOSING
LIABILITY ON CHINESE MANUFACTURERS
Persistent debate among legal scholars and advocates regarding the ideal
solution for holding foreign manufacturers liable for faulty products highlights
the ongoing uncertainty inherent in this area of the law.308 The fund concept is
a practical framework that aims to ensure availability of economic
compensation for the injured consumer; however, it is not the only possible
solution. One resolution to the current legal dilemma would be for the United
States and China to execute a bilateral treaty mandating the enforcement of
each other’s products liability judgments.309 A bilateral treaty would be
specific to the unique relationship the United States and China enjoy, and the

304

Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963).
See supra text accompanying notes 8–10.
306 The manufacturer is directly responsible for production and therefore is arguably the party most
responsible for product quality issues.
307 Experts Predict Passage of the Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act of 2010: What Does
This Law Mean to U.S. Importers and Exporters?, KATTEN (July 21, 2010), http://www.kattenlaw.com/
experts-predict-passage-of-foreign-manufacturers-legal-accountability-act.
308 See Clarke, supra note 238, at 2–3.
309 Donald C. Clarke argues a treaty is the only ground upon which a Chinese court would enforce a U.S.
judgment. Id. at 2–3.
305
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two countries could negotiate and tailor the terms to best reflect their needs and
concerns. Such a treaty should command specific penalties, likely economic, if
either the United States or China failed to enforce a legitimate judgment from
the other nation. Political activist and four-time Green Party presidential
candidate Ralph Nader is a longtime advocate of a consumer protection treaty
with China.310 In addition to calling for increased access to Chinese factories
and testing laboratories, Nader argues a United States–China treaty must
subject Chinese companies who do business in the United States to U.S. tort
and contract laws.311 Although a bilateral treaty is an attractive solution, it is
unlikely China will consent to such an agreement. Chinese manufacturers are
benefitting financially from their poorly made products, and most
manufacturers are able to evade all economic and legal liability associated with
their goods.312 Meanwhile, the Chinese export industry and economy continue
to grow.313 China has insufficient motivation to voluntarily subject its
manufacturers to legal liability in the United States. As a result, the United
States needs to focus on a workable solution that offers protection for U.S.
consumers. The creation of a consumer settlement fund may be the answer for
which the United States has been searching.
A. The Fund Concept
The end goal of this Comment’s legal analysis is to ensure economic
compensation for injured U.S. consumers. In the absence of a bilateral treaty,
the United States cannot force Chinese courts to recognize and enforce U.S.
judgments. Therefore, the United States must look for alternative ways to make
an injured consumer whole. The United States should create a consumer
settlement fund, modeled after Superfund: an environmental program created
by the Comprehensive Environment Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (“CERCLA”) of 1980 to address hazardous waste sites.314 CERCLA was
enacted following the discovery of toxic waste dumps in the 1970s and allows
the Environmental Protection Agency to seek out responsible parties and
compel them to perform cleanups or reimburse the government for such
310 Ralph Nader, Weak-Kneed in China, COUNTERPUNCH (Nov. 25, 2009), http://www.counterpunch.org/
nader11252009.html.
311 Id.
312 Hunt, supra note 32, at 919.
313 See supra text accompanying notes 48–50.
314 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675
(2006); see also Basic Information: What Is Superfund?, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.
gov/superfund/about.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2010).
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cleanups.315 When multiple parties are responsible for the contamination, each
participant is required to pay.316 Like Superfund, the consumer settlement fund
would enforce penalties against parties responsible for injuring U.S.
consumers. The primary target of the fund would be the foreign manufacturers
directly responsible for producing faulty products.
The fund concept would also draw inspiration from the September 11, 2001
Victim Compensation Fund (“VCF”) and the British Petroleum (“BP”) Gulf
Coast Claims Fund (“BP Fund”).317 The theory behind the VCF and BP Fund
was to persuade people to accept payments for their losses up front, in lieu of
engaging in long, costly, and uncertain lawsuits.318 Following the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress passed the Air Transportation Safety
and System Stabilization Act.319 The act combined U.S. Treasury revenues and
charitable donations to create the VCF.320 The VCF’s goal was to provide
economic compensation for all the victims of the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks.321 Victims were narrowly defined. Claims could only be brought by or
on behalf of those who were on one of the hijacked flights or who were
physically present at the World Trade Center or Pentagon sites within twelve
hours of the attack, and who suffered physical injury, requiring medical help,
within a designated time period.322 While participation in the VCF was
optional, if injured parties claimed compensation from the VCF, they waived
the right to bring suit in court.323 The legislation placed strict time regulations
on filing claims.324 Once a claim was filed against the VCF, it had to be
determined within 120 days of filing and payment received within twenty days

315

Basic Information: What Is Superfund?, supra note 314.
Lawrence Hurley, Lawyers Still Cleaning Up over Superfund Sites, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2011), http://
www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/01/03/03greenwire-lawyers-still-cleaning-up-over-superfund-sites-92748.html.
317 See Michael Cooper, Two Funds, Same Goal: Compensate, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2010, at A14.
Commenter James C. Harris, who advocates for adoption of a comprehensive social insurance system,
acknowledges 9/11 was an “unprecedented horror” but argues the extraordinary background circumstance
should not limit the fund model in application. James C. Harris, Comment, Why the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund Proves the Case for a New Zealand-Style Comprehensive Social Insurance Plan in the
United States, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1367, 1370 (2006).
318 Cooper, supra note 317.
319 Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2006).
320 Harris, supra note 317, at 1369.
321 Id.
322 James R. Copland, Tragic Solutions: The 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, Historical Antecedents,
and Lessons for Tort Reform 20 (Jan. 13, 2005) (working paper, Center For Legal Policy at the Manhattan
Institute), available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/clpwp_01-13-05.pdf.
323 Harris, supra note 317, at 1376.
324 Copland, supra note 322, at 24.
316
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of determination.325 Attorney General John Ashcroft appointed Kenneth
Feinberg, a Washington lawyer, as the VCF’s special master.326 Feinberg
possessed enormous power and discretion to interpret and apply the law as it
applied to fund payouts.327 Feinberg’s compensation decisions were final; no
judicial review was permitted.328
Overall, the September 11 VCF was highly successful; ninety-seven
percent of all eligible claimants received compensation from the fund and total
awards were near $7 billion.329 Although claimants gave up substantial
litigation rights, the high percentage rate for participation in the VCF suggests
that under the right circumstances, claimants will opt into a fund approach to
seek closure on their claims, despite the risk of receiving less compensation
than they might in a jury trial.330 The VCF relieved the vagueness and
inconsistency inherent in jury determinations and spared claimants years of
discovery, litigation, and appellate processes as well as the transaction costs
associated with litigation.331 The VCF was created under unique and extreme
circumstances, but it is a good injury compensation model and its application
should not be limited to disaster scenarios.
The Deepwater Horizon Spill in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010
prompted the creation of the BP Fund—a $20-billion escrow account dedicated
to compensating victims of the oil spill.332 This fund originated on June 16,
2010, following an agreement between BP and President Barack Obama
stipulating the basic terms of the $20-billion account.333 Unlike the VCF,
which relied partially on charitable donations, BP is the sole contributor to the
account.334 President Obama appointed Kenneth Feinberg, special master of
the VCF, to administer the BP Fund.335 Since the creation of the fund, Feinberg

325
326

Harris, supra note 317, at 1377.
Neil King, Jr., Feinberg Ramps Up $20 Billion Compensation Fund, WALL ST. J., June 21, 2010, at

A1.
327

Copland, supra note 322, at 20.
Id.
329 Harris, supra note 317, at 1379.
330 Linda S. Mullenix, The Future of Tort Reform: Possible Lessons from the World Trade Center Victim
Compensation Fund, 53 EMORY L.J. 1315, 1344 (2004).
331 Id. at 1345.
332 About the $20 Billion Dollar BP Fund for Oil Spill Victims, BP FUND (July 21, 2010), http://www.
thebpfund.com [hereinafter About the BP Fund].
333 Id.
334 See Kimberly Kindy, Overseer of BP’s Gulf Spill Claims Fund Gets His Hands Dirty, WASH. POST,
Oct. 20, 2010, at A6.
335 Id.
328
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has tried to maintain separation from both BP and the Obama Administration
and has implemented independent and neutral policies regarding the claims.336
Under the BP Fund, claimants can get emergency payments for six months
without giving up their rights to sue.337 However, claimants who decide to opt
in for consideration of a final payment do waive their litigation rights.338 While
administration of the BP Fund is ongoing,339 thus far the fund has received
more than 490,000 claims and has paid out approximately $3.5 billion to
170,000 claimants.340 Superfund, the VCF, and the BP Fund were enacted
under varying circumstances and their structures and goals somewhat differ.
However, each serves as a useful framework upon which to model a consumer
settlement fund.
The first step in setting up a consumer settlement fund would be to enact
the fund. On December 11, 1980, the U.S. Congress passed CERCLA, which
created a tax on the chemical and petroleum industries and provided federal
authority to respond to dangerous substances that threaten public health or the
environment.341 The money collected from the tax goes into a trust fund,
Superfund, for cleaning up hazardous waste sites.342 Similarly, on September
22, 2001, the U.S. Congress enacted the Air Transportation Safety and System
Stabilization Act, which created the September 11 VCF.343 Like Superfund and
the VCF, the consumer settlement fund should be enacted through legislation.
Support for the proposed fund would likely come from both Democrats and
Republicans. While U.S. lawmakers understand and appreciate the importance
of the United States–China trade relationship, in today’s tough economy, both
Democrats and Republicans are under pressure to support any bill that protects
U.S. companies.344 Domestic producers, who have a legal presence in the
United States and thus can be sued for faulty products, are currently at a
336

About the BP Fund, supra note 332.
Oil Fund Administrator: Come to Me, Not Court, CBS NEWS (July 19, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.
com/stories/2010/07/19/national/main6692221.shtml.
338 Id.
339 Kenneth Feinberg has incurred criticism from claimants unhappy with their compensation. BP Claims
Czar Continues Gulf Tour amid Complaints, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 11, 2011, 5:31 AM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20110111/us-gulf-oil-spill-claims; Troy King, Opinion, Fund Chief Can’t Be
Trusted, USA TODAY (Jan. 28, 2010, 8:30 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2010-1229-editorial29_ST1_N.htm.
340 Moira Herbst, BP Fund, Feinberg Face Lawsuits by Claimants, REUTERS, Feb. 28, 2011, available at
http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFN2826927720110228.
341 Basic Information: What Is Superfund?, supra note 314.
342 Id.
343 See supra text accompanying note 319.
344 Kessler & Sapien, supra note 1.
337
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competitive disadvantage against foreign manufacturers, who can escape
liability.345 Furthermore, neither party would want American voters to think it
was protecting Chinese manufacturers who were dumping defective products,
such as toxic drywall, in the United States.346
After the consumer settlement fund is enacted, management of the fund
must be determined. While CERCLA grants the Environmental Protection
Agency the power to conduct cleanups of toxic waste sites and compels
contribution from responsible parties, the proposed legislation should create a
new and independent entity charged with development and administration of
the consumer settlement fund. The CPSC, with its knowledge and experience
in the products liability arena, seems like the logical agency to undertake this
responsibility. However, the agency is already overburdened, understaffed, and
underfunded.347 A newly created independent body would be better able to
receive and analyze claims from U.S. plaintiffs related specifically to foreign
manufacturers. In this way, the consumer settlement fund would mimic the
VCF and the BP Fund. Both funds employed an independent unit to collect,
analyze, and process claims.348 Unlike the VCF and the BP Fund, which were
each created in response to a single devastating event,349 the consumer
settlement fund would address the ongoing problem of U.S. consumers injured
by foreign-made products. The VCF, which terminated operations on June 15,
2004,350 and the BP Fund were both enacted as temporary mechanisms to
resolve a defined set of claims.351 The consumer settlement fund, on the other
hand, would be a more permanent institution.
The theory behind the consumer settlement fund would be to grant the
compensation and deterrence that the U.S. law fails to provide. CERCLA
provides a framework for “remediation and liability for releases of hazardous
materials that pose a risk to human health and the environment.”352 Similarly,
the consumer settlement fund would provide a mechanism that serves dual
purposes: compensating U.S. consumers and deterring foreign manufacturers
from releasing dangerous products into the U.S. market. Compensation would
345

See Griswold & James, supra note 231, at 1.
Kessler & Sapien, supra note 1.
347 See supra text accompanying notes 256, 266–67.
348 See supra text accompanying notes 326, 336.
349 See supra text accompanying notes 319, 332.
350 Copland, supra note 322, at 20 n.123.
351 See Harris, supra note 317, at 1378 (stating the VCF required claims to be filed within a two-year
period); About the BP Fund, supra note 332.
352 Gregory Mandel, Nanotechnology Governance, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1323, 1356 (2008).
346
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be charged to an institutional arbiter. While the VCF and BP Fund employed
Kenneth Feinberg as administrator,353 the consumer settlement fund, a more
enduring entity, should grant power to the institution, not an individual. With
durability in mind, the proposed fund should set up a permanent claims court.
The court would hear a victim’s defective product claim, determine liability,
assess any damages, and, if appropriate, award a proportionate monetary
remedy as a distribution from the fund. Unlike the VCF,354 a traditional
appeals process would be available.
The fund would provide an alternative to engaging in a fruitless lawsuit
against a foreign manufacturer. A consumer who is injured by foreign-made
products should be able to bring his claim to the consumer settlement fund’s
claims court before engaging in litigation.355 If the arbiter accepts the claim
and awards a payout from the fund, the claimant should be barred from suing
in court.356 An injured consumer should not be able to recover twice for a
single action. However, if the arbiter rejects the claim or the claimant does not
receive a payout, the claimant should be allowed to pursue litigation in court.
Similarly, if the claimant brings a lawsuit and receives economic
compensation, they should be barred from receiving a payout from the fund. If
the claimant brings suit in court and loses or is unable to collect on their
judgment (because the defendant is insolvent or a foreign manufacturer), they
should be allowed to bring their claim to the fund’s claims court. The purpose
of the fund is not to discourage claimants from bringing lawsuits, but to
provide economic compensation for an injury where a lawsuit would fail to do
so.
In addition to adjudicating claims, the consumer settlement fund would
determine when a foreign manufacturer would be required to contribute to the
fund. Under CERCLA, liability arises when a party releases a “hazardous
substance,” as defined by the Environmental Protection Agency, into the
environment.357 Under the consumer settlement fund, liability would arise
when a foreign manufacturer produces a defective product that injures a

353

See supra text accompanying notes 326, 336.
See supra text accompanying note 328.
355 This framework does not necessarily let responsible U.S. parties (importers, distributors, or sellers) off
the hook. While some claimants will opt into the fund, others will choose to pursue traditional litigation,
hoping for increased jury verdicts in court.
356 If a claimant opts into either the VCF or BP Fund, they are barred from pursuing a separate claim in
court. See supra text accompanying notes 325, 338.
357 Mandel, supra note 352, at 1356.
354
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consumer in the United States. If the manufacturer refuses to compensate the
consumer, the United States should flag the manufacturer. The responsible
manufacturer must contribute a designated sum of money to the settlement
fund if they wish to continue to export products to the United States.358 Once a
foreign manufacturer has injured a U.S. consumer, the United States must
demand the money up front as a “fee” for doing business in the United
States.359
The threshold question under CERCLA for determining liability is whether
the substance in question is “hazardous.”360 Under the consumer settlement
fund, three initial questions would arise: (1) whether a consumer was
“injured,” (2) whether the product was defective, and (3) where the product
was manufactured. In response to the first question, injury should not be
limited solely to those physically hurt by Chinese products. Rather, the
definition of injury should be broad enough to encompass those individuals
who have sustained economic injury. For example, homeowners who have
suffered depreciation on their homes due to Chinese-made drywall should be
eligible for reimbursement. Secondly, the claimant must prove the product was
defective—that it was flawed or that it malfunctioned. Finally, the injured
consumer must prove a foreign manufacturer produced the injurious product.
Identifying the responsible manufacturer may pose substantial difficulties. This
is addressed in the next Subpart of this Comment. Once a claimant has
satisfied these three initial questions, the claim could proceed and the arbiter
would determine causation and damages.
While compensation is the primary aim of the consumer settlement fund,
deterrence is a secondary goal and an essential component of the proposed
framework. Deterrence would occur in two forms: economic and reputational.
Economic deterrence is necessary because the price of Chinese products sold
in the United States fails to reflect potential accident costs.361 Chinese
manufacturers are currently able to avoid liability for their defective products;
therefore, manufacturers lack the economic incentive to install preventative

358 The proposed framework will not be able to compensate consumers who have been injured prior to the
creation of the fund by defective foreign-made products. Rather, it is a prospective solution that aims to
provide a compensation model for consumers in the future.
359 China’s refusal to indemnify injured U.S. consumers epitomizes why the United States needs to
demand the money up front as a “fee” for doing business in the United States.
360 See Mandel, supra note 352, at 1356.
361 Hunt, supra note 32, at 919.

GLYNN GALLEYSPROOFS.2

2012]

6/28/2012 10:33 AM

TOXIC TOYS AND DANGEROUS DRYWALL

361

safety measures.362 Requiring manufacturers to contribute to a fund if they
injure a consumer would force the manufacturer to internalize the cost of a
faulty product. The requisite contribution, as determined by the fund’s
administrators, should fully compensate the injured consumer and provide a
deterrent effect.363 To create effective deterrence, the penalty must be
significant enough to dissuade the manufacturer from distributing defective or
dangerous products in the U.S. market. Furthermore, naming the responsible
party would be injurious to the manufacturer’s reputation in the United States
and would reflect poorly on the U.S. company associated with the
manufacturer. Competition among Chinese manufacturers for partnerships
with American companies is ferocious364 and U.S. firms are less likely to
partner with a Chinese manufacturer who is notorious for producing dangerous
products.
B. Challenges and Limitations Associated with the Fund Concept
There would be a number of challenges associated with the implementation
of a consumer settlement fund. The primary hurdle would remain the ability to
identify the responsible foreign manufacturer. As previously discussed, long,
complex, and shifting supply chains often make identification of the
responsible party extremely difficult.365 U.S. companies who outsource their
manufacturing to China must be able to identify the manufacturer with whom
they have a business or contractual relationship. If the U.S. company cannot
identify the manufacturer responsible for producing the product at issue, the
company itself will be required to make the requisite contribution to the fund.
This model encourages U.S. companies to ensure, to the best of their ability,
that the manufacturer with whom they contract is identifiable and safetyconscious. If Chinese manufacturers fail to step up and take the blame for their
faulty products, thereby leaving the U.S. companies to take the hit, U.S. firms
will likely terminate the relationship and the manufacturer will be excluded
from the U.S. market. The best way to foster the relationship between Chinese
manufacturers and U.S. companies is to urge the U.S. parties to disclose the
details and requirements of the fund before initiating the business relationship.
Ideally, the two parties would sign a contract, and the Chinese manufacturer
362

See id.
One of Congress’ goals in enacting CERCLA was to provide a deterrent to “irresponsible hazardousmaterial management.” L. De-Wayne Layfield, CERCLA, Successor Liability, and the Federal Common Law:
Responding to an Uncertain Legal Standard, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1237, 1241 (1990).
364 See supra text accompanying note 71.
365 See supra text accompanying note 118–21.
363
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would agree to make the requisite contribution if an injury occurs. If the
Chinese manufacturer knows it will have to pay into the fund for a defective
product accident, the manufacturer will have the incentive to cooperate with
product safety requirements before production even begins.
A related issue is deciding how far down the foreign manufacturing chain
the United States should seek compensation. While primary manufacturers
who contract with the United States should have to contribute to the fund, for
subcontractor, or “shadow” factories, liability is less clear. U.S. companies
often do not have knowledge of the manufacturer’s use of shadow factories or
subcontractors. This problem arose in the 2007 Mattel toy recalls, which
Mattel CEO Bob Eckert blamed on a subcontractor who used paint from a nonauthorized third-party supplier.366 The best way to resolve this issue is to place
liability squarely on the shoulders of the foreign manufacturer who directly
contracts with the U.S. company. If the manufacturer chooses to outsource
production to other factories, they will remain liable for quality issues that
result from the delegation.
Providing notice to the foreign manufacturer could remain a procedural
roadblock under the proposed fund. If a manufacturer’s product injures a U.S.
consumer and the manufacturer is held liable, the consumer settlement fund
would demand compensation as a condition of exporting to the United States.
The fund would be charged with providing notice to the manufacturer detailing
the contribution requirements. However, as previously discussed, Chinese
manufacturers often evade notice or cannot be located.367 If the foreign
manufacturer fails to respond to the contribution notice, the onus would be
placed on the contracting U.S. party to contact the manufacturer. If the U.S.
party fails, it will assume the contribution requirement. This structure provides
yet another incentive for U.S. parties to contract with responsible foreign
manufacturers.
Finally, the fund must comport with WTO rules and regulations.368 WTO
rules mandate that any requirement placed on products from one WTO
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367 See supra text accompanying note 235.
368 The WTO is the international organization charged with regulating trade relationships. About the
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member must apply equally to all members.369 Therefore, the United States
cannot single out Chinese manufacturers for contribution and must apply the
requirement universally. Furthermore, under the WTO, import-restricting
measures designed to protect public health and safety are permissible;
however, they must have an “adequate scientific foundation and may impose
only limited and non-discriminatory restrictions on trade.”370 There must be
proof that a manufacturer has created a defective product, and contribution to
the fund should only be required until a manufacturer’s safety record is
deemed adequate.
Although there would be potential problems associated with the consumer
settlement fund concept, the benefits would far outweigh the costs. Most
importantly, the fund would reimburse U.S. victims for injuries sustained from
defective foreign-made products. U.S. plaintiffs are unable to enforce
judgments against Chinese manufacturers; therefore, unless they can collect on
judgments against U.S. parties, their injuries will remain uncompensated.
Additionally, the potential for an economic penalty would induce foreign
manufacturers to comply with product safety laws and would provide an
incentive for U.S. parties to contract with responsible and safety conscious
manufacturers.
CONCLUSION
U.S. law is currently grappling with its inability to require foreign
manufacturers to compensate U.S. consumers who are injured by defective
foreign-made products. Personal jurisdiction, service of process, and
enforcement of the judgment remain the three primary procedural hurdles a
U.S. plaintiff must overcome before successfully bringing suit against a
foreign manufacturer. The two Supreme Court cases, J. McIntyre Machinery,
Ltd. v. Nicastro and Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, and
the proposed congressional legislation, the Foreign Manufacturers Legal
Accountability Act of 2011, prove the shortcomings in the legal system are
pressing and significant. Unfortunately, neither the Supreme Court cases nor
the proposed Congressional legislation solves the most pressing of the
procedural hurdles—enforcement of a U.S. judgment overseas.

369 Services: Rules for Growth and Investment, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_
e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm6_e.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2012).
370 Delisle & Trujillo, supra note 172, at 162.
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While amendments and alternations to the law through judicial and
legislative activity should be welcomed, the United States should not sit by
passively and wait for change. The United States must affirmatively act to
protect its citizens from harm imposed by foreign manufacturers. The toxic
drywall is simply the latest in a series of defective products from China.
China’s unbeatable prices and paramount position in global manufacturing
chains indicate Chinese-made products will remain dominant in the United
States. Resource shortages at the U.S. border guarantee defective Chinesemade products will continue to enter the United States. U.S. consumers cannot
be fully insulated from such products; however, they should be legally
protected from the consequences posed by these dangerous goods.
The creation of a consumer settlement fund not only provides the economic
compensation the law cannot ensure, but it also encourages the formation of
responsible and accountable partnerships between U.S. companies and Chinese
manufacturers. The fund would be unable to force foreign manufacturers to
comply with U.S. law directly, but would penalize the U.S. contracting party if
the manufacturer failed to provide the requisite compensation. U.S. parties,
knowing they would be liable if the manufacturer failed to uphold their
requirements under the fund, would have the incentive to contract with reliable
manufacturers who comport with product safety standards. Innocent U.S.
victims should not be penalized because U.S. law has failed to garner
economic compensation from foreign manufacturers. The consumer settlement
fund would succeed where the U.S. law has failed—in providing economic
relief for U.S. consumers injured by defective foreign-made products.
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